The majority of PSCRP materials in the final month of 2024 concentrated on the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
In two subsequent papers, Ze’ev Khanin analyzes the difficulties that accompany US President-elect Donald Trump’s ambitious goals to end the war in Ukraine. Before the elections, Trump promised to initiate a ceasefire, potentially leading to the end of the war, even though the details of his peace plan remain unclear. However, the peace framework under discussion is based on three key principles, namely, freezing the conflict (the battlefield situation at the time is frozen, with Russia remaining in control of large Ukrainian territories), security guarantees without NATO membership (the European peacekeeping mission might oversee a buffer zone between the two countries), and pressure exerted on both sides (threats to increase assistance to Ukraine or to reduce financial and military support). On the contrary, Kyiv insists on Zelensky’s “peace formula” (which means the comeback to the 1991 borders and NATO membership), and, since 88% of Ukrainians still believe in a victory over Russia (as of September 2024), selling a peace deal based on territorial compromises does not look feasible. The Carnegie Endowment polling in May 2024 demonstrated that 70% of Ukrainians would demand new political leadership if they disagreed with the provisional peace deal. Speculations about the elections in Ukraine resurge; however, they will face significant legal and financial hurdles (huge election budget, absent provisions for voting by soldiers and displaced persons, and the required martial law amendments).
In his second paper on the matter, Khanin scrutinizes the three options that have been proposed to Russian leadership by Trump and his associates so far—namely, the plans by (1) Keith Kellog (the incoming Russia-Ukraine envoy) and Fred Fleitz, (2) JD Vance (Vice President-elect), and (3) Richard Grenell (former Trump intelligence chief). These plans differ in details but agree on basic principles, namely, the above-mentioned freezing of the current battle lines, the creation of a demilitarized zone or, alternatively, some “autonomous zones” in the east of Ukraine, and the denial of possible NATO membership for Ukraine in the foreseeable future (which was a critical element of Zelensky’s “Victory Plan” proposed in September 2024). The plans also include a “stick” (for the Kremlin) of a dramatic increase in military aid to Kyiv; however, clearly, the “carrots” proposed to Russia outweigh all possible sticks, and the current chances of Kyiv becoming at least a “major U.S. ally outside NATO” are slim. Ukrainian leadership, affected by manpower shortages, growing territorial losses, outrage at corruption, and unjust distribution of the war burden, has much less time and room for maneuver than the Kremlin (which enjoys the weakness of the internal opposition and external sanctions). There remains a built-in contradiction in the vision of the Ukrainian political establishment: “Understanding of the lack of prospects for defeating Russia on the battlefield (…) and the need to seek a diplomatic solution” is confronted with the “impossibility of removing from the official discourse the declared goal of resisting Russian aggression.”.
Sam Kliger provides interesting observations of how Russia’s war against Ukraine has influenced the Russian-speaking Jewish (RSJ) community in the United States. Even though more than 40% of the American Russian-speaking Jews come from Ukraine, they used to call themselves “Russian Jews” – although this trend started to shift after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. According to Kliger’s observations, back then, about half of Russophone immigrants in New York somehow supported the annexation (especially elderly people originating from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan). At the same time, 30% strongly opposed it (younger people from Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), and 20% had no position on the issue. In the first half of 2022, about two-thirds of the community supported Ukraine (half of them – unconditionally), and about a third supported Russia (though the actual proportion can be higher because any public support for Moscow is extremely unpopular). During a focus group discussion among the RSJ community in 2022, 70% of participants agreed that the US presidential candidate’s position on the war in Ukraine (with an eye to the 2024 elections) was not significant for their voting. Also, most participants agreed that Israel should not interfere in the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine (since it has its own political interests in maintaining positive relations with both sides). Concerning the US aid to Ukraine, three options were voiced: that the “U.S. should not be too much involved in providing Ukraine with sophisticated weapons that would escalate the conflict further,” that “the U.S. must provide Ukraine with all means necessary to win the war,” and that “the U.S. should continue its support for Ukraine” but “all aid should be transparent” and not unlimited.
The PSCRP team explores the important issue of sanctions circumvention, which allows Moscow to enjoy Western technologies in its war against Ukraine. Some key Western-manufactured parts are regularly identified in Russian UAVs and other equipment; for instance, in the Merlin VR, there are components produced by companies such as Analog Devices (US) and Ampleon (the Netherlands). The main routes to bypass export sanctions are through Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which have jointly exported over $126 million worth of microchips to Russia between September 2022 and June 2024. In Belarus, the largest supplier is the company named Pervy Kontinent, established two months after the start of the full-scale war. Staut, a sanctioned company by both the US and the EU, is the main buyer in Russia. According to the US Bureau of Industry and Security, Armenia has imported five times more chips and processors from the US in 2022 compared to 2021; 97% of these were re-exported to Russia. The Armenian Shipping Company is responsible for the container transportation of sanctioned goods to Russia through the ports of Batumi and Novorossiysk. The export of microchips from Kazakhstan to Russia increased seventyfold in 2022, compared to 2021, and weapon exports from the EU firms to the post-Soviet countries have increased dramatically since 2022. These facts demonstrate the incomplete efficacy of current sanctions and export controls and the need to tighten technology transfer controls by imposing mandatory “end-use certificates” subject to verification and the advanced monitoring of supply chains.
The war in Ukraine has directly and indirectly affected other major conflicts on the world map. Ze’ev Khanin highlights the recently increased use of the “Palestinian” factor in Russia’s foreign policy. After the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s new foreign policy doctrine has transformed into a peculiar synthesis of neoconservatism and leftist Soviet-style ideology, with its anti-colonial aspect meant to serve the needs of cooperation with the “Global South.” Now, Russia intends to set (at least some) tone in the Middle Eastern peace process, rather than be just its “co-sponsor.” The final reformatting of the Kremlin’s attitudes towards the Middle East occurred after the 7th of October, 2023, when Russia almost openly supported Hamas (a satellite of Iran that is Moscow’s close ally). In October 2024, PNA/PLO and Hamas delegations became honorary observer guests at the BRICS summit in Kazan. After the 24th of February, 2022, the Palestinian National Administration has openly sided with Moscow, while Russian officials are still repeating the long-exhausted formula of “independent Palestinian state” as the only way to conflict resolution. Interestingly, in the March 2024 presidential elections in Russia, 90% of Palestinian residents with Russian citizenship voted for Vladimir Putin, while most Israeli residents with Russian passports voted for Vladislav Davankov, an alternative candidate. According to the polls, nowadays, respondents in Russia are several times more sympathetic to Palestinian Arabs than they are to the State of Israel; if in the United States, 31% of respondents support Israel in the ongoing conflict, in Russia, it is just 6%. Russia tries to gain geopolitical advantages while intercepting the status of a “sponsor of the Palestinian cause.” However, if for the West, the creation of a “Palestinian state” is mostly seen as a way to solve the problem, for Russia, it is merely a tool of geopolitical confrontation.
Considering the recent events in other post-Soviet countries, Vakhtang Maisaia outlines three possible scenarios for the political crisis in Georgia, caused by the recent parliamentary and presidential elections’ outcomes. While Mikheil Kavelashvili, who represents the pro-Russian “Georgian Dream” party, was elected president on December 16th by the electoral college, only several countries have extended to him their congratulations so far (namely, Serbia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Armenia). Salome Zourabichvili, the incumbent president supported by most European leaders, has refused to vacate her position and office, with security forces remaining (seemingly) neutral. The possible scenarios on the eve of the inauguration planned for the very end of 2024, included the use of force by the pro-Russian government (leading to a potential “belarusization” of the country), the establishment of a new power center and a technical interim government by Salome Zourabichvili, and “a 50/50 compromise and political stalemate,” with Zourabichvili stepping down but refusing to recognize the incumbents. (Now, looking from January 2025, we see that the 3rd scenario actually worked, and Zourabichvili has left the residence). The potential crisis can be aggravated by the weakness of the Georgian opposition and the susceptibility of the ruling “Georgian Dream” party to internal shocks.
BESA Center’s Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program would like to wish our readers a joyful and prosperous new year. In 2025, we hope to further bring to your attention and scrutinize the most pressing issues of post-Soviet zones of conflict and political instability.