In May 2024, the PSCR program’s research focused, as always, on the political dynamics in various post-Soviet regions, and the external dimensions of post-Soviet foreign politics.
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman, in his analysis of the new Russian foreign policy ideology of “anti-colonialism,” highlighted the role of anti-Zionist propaganda in this ideological cluster. Anti-Israeli stance has traditionally been part and parcel of the Soviet anti-colonial rhetoric, and the present ideological attempts follow the same path, trying to appeal to the Global South nations and sustain allied relations with the Tehran regime. At the same time, the Kremlin is contributing, through its RT media holding, to the anti-Israeli propaganda in the West. It also maintains the sympathies of some internal and external far-right circles that support anti-Semitic ideas.
Konstantin Pakhalyuk illustrates the above-described Russian geopolitical doctrine with the African empirics. He concludes that Russia has pragmatically exploited such trends as low political stability, a high number of military coups, and the shift of radical Islamism to Africa. Through “informal mechanisms of power projection,” including the Wagner Group’s activities, Russia succeeded in becoming one of the power brokers in the continent. After February 2022, African countries demonstrated indifference towards the war in Ukraine, evidenced by their voting in the UN General Assembly.
Russia’s support for Hamas is equally situated within this (not that new) anticolonial paradigm. Robert Freedman highlights the recent significant deterioration of the Russian-Israeli relations against the background of the diplomatic support Russia lends to the “Palestinian cause.” However, the two main Israeli goals in its relations with Moscow are still achieved, i.e., the freedom of the Israeli warplane operations in the Syrian air space and of the aliyah from Russia. The flow of US arms to Israel during the war has deteriorated support for the US in the Global South, which Russia, supplying aid to Gaza and backing Palestinian actors in the UN, has (partially) benefited from – even though Hamas is unpopular with some influential Arab leaders. All in all, the Russian efforts to claim back its status as a Middle East power broker after the Hamas attack had little success, and its influence in the conflict remains limited.
Moving westwards, Velvl Chernin has analyzed the political developments in Gagauzia, the southern region of Moldova. Despite being openly influenced by the Kremlin authorities, the head of Gagauzia, Evghenia Guțul, does not seem to desire an open armed confrontation with the central authorities of Moldova because of the region’s extremely weak political and military positions. Guțul provokes the current conflict (also by demonstratively calling for political help from Russia) between Comrat and Chisinau, first, to mobilize pro-Russian forces in Moldova ahead of the presidential elections and the planned referendum on Moldova’s EU accession; second, to improve the autonomy’s economic situation by blackmailing Chisinau into financial concessions.
The broader picture of the political climate in Moldova ahead of the 2024 presidential elections is presented by Anatolii Dirun. He states that the war in Ukraine allowed Maia Sandu, the incumbent president who became unpopular since her election in 2020, to shift the focus of public attention from internal problems to external challenges, to “clear” Moldova’s information space, and to receive for the country an EU candidate status in June 2023. However, the 2023 local elections’ results were unsatisfactory for the ruling party. Sandu’s primary goal is to win in the first round because a consolidated opposition candidate would have the chance of winning the campaign; nevertheless, no single opposition representative is currently in sight. The outcome of the upcoming elections may affect not only potential European integration but also internal peace in Moldova and on its borders, given the fears of the “pro-European turn” that are still alive in Transnistria.
Apart from certain regions of Moldova, Russian influence is also significant in Kazakhstan, which is the focus of another analysis prepared by the PSCRP team. The authors underscore Kazakhstan’s precarious position in light of Russia’s potential to destabilize the local ethnopolitical situation, particularly in the north. With no significant alternatives provided by Western countries, the country’s leadership must make concessions to the Kremlin and constantly debunk suspicions and provocations. The authors emphasize the significance of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, as a potential tool to reduce Russian economic pressure on Kazakhstan; however, the project is currently progressing at a slow pace.
Finally, the material by the PSCRP team discusses the ongoing mass protests in Armenia caused by the agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the border delimitation in the Tavush region (with the Armenian leadership agreeing to return four villages to Azerbaijan). The opposition, both anti- and pro-Russian, is now united under the guidance of Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan of the Armenian Apostolic Church. However, some experts believe the actors harmed by the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict might stay behind the protest rallies, notably, Russia, Iran, and the Armenian diaspora. Both Russia and Iran will be deprived of their regional influence if the conflict ends; interestingly, the highest Armenian clergy is claimed to have direct contacts with the Russian and Iranian special services. For the international Armenian diaspora, in its turn, the reconciliation with Azerbaijan would “signify a loss of leverage and lobbying tools.”
The Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program stays committed to its mission of providing our readership with prompt analytic responses to the ever-emerging regional challenges in the coming months.