Search Results for: Uzbekistan – Page 2
In December 2023, the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program published papers on separatist threats and Church-related antisemitism in Russia, French participation in post-Soviet geopolitical dynamics, the perception of Israelโs war against Hamas in Russia and Ukraine, and the geopolitical (re)orientation of Armenia.
After the Second Karabakh War (2020) and especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2022), France saw a number of new diplomatic opportunities opening up for it in the southern post-Soviet space as Russia's traditional influence waned.
In November 2023, the BESA Post-Soviet Conflict Research Program published a series of texts, half of which focus on the recent surge of anti-Semitism in the region of interest, and the rest on the recent dynamics of military supplies in the South Caucasus, Russian-Georgian relations, and the electoral behavior of Kazakhstan's Russian-speaking minority.
BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 1 (September-October 2023)
The Hamas attack on Israel triggered a wave of antisemitism in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The root causes of this surge are similar: anti-Israeli propaganda in Russia (which is anti-liberal and anti-Western in nature) and in the Islamic world (usually of a specifically religious nature), as well as in the West (typically taking on an extreme leftist nature).
In the months after 21 September 2022, when the Kremlin announced military mobilization, nearly a million Russian citizens entered Kazakhstan; though, two-thirds had already left the country before January 2023. ย The reason for the unexpected rise in popularity of migration to the Central Asian state was that Russian citizens do not need a visa or even a โforeign travelโ passport to go there.
For a significant period, Russian policy in Central Asia has differed from its approach toward Ukrainian or Georgian issues. It was characterized by fewer elements of ideology and greater pragmatism. Pragmatic elements that "softened" Russian foreign policy in the Central Asian direction persisted until 2021, owing to various factors. Russian officials, to some extent, recognized the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian countries, leading to a more accommodating stance toward the region. Central Asia was perceived as having limited prospects for NATO and EU expansion, partly due to the presence of authoritarian regimes and its geographical distance from Europe. This made Moscow's influence appear less threatened compared to regions like Ukraine. Global strategic considerations compelled Putin to acquiesce both Chinese and Turkish influences in Central Asia. Putin's personal limited interest in Central Asian affairs and the influence of regional leaders on Russian decision-makers sometimes fostered an atmosphere of pluralism. Russia shared a common enemy in the form of radical Islam with both the West and secular regimes in Muslim countries.
Common trends in Russia's relations with Central Asian countries during the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Russiaโs full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked the completion of a series of changes that gradually reshaped the balance of power and diplomatic relations that had established in the post-Soviet space since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This event created a considerable strategic uncertainty.