Battlefield Decision in the Iron Swords War: Renewing the Discussion

In the Iron Swords War, the IDF achieved battlefield decision over the enemy in two theaters of war in a manner contrary to customary IDF doctrine. In Gaza, a tactical and operational battlefield decision was achieved against Hamas based on the erosion of the enemy’s forces and capabilities, mainly through offensive ground activity. In Lebanon, a strategic, operational, and tactical battlefield decision (in that order) was achieved against Hezbollah that was based on the stratagem of a series of strikes, including the explosion of pagers, air strikes against capabilities and commanders, and a later ground operation against combat infrastructure in the border area. The concept of the battlefield decision has gradually disappeared from IDF discourse in recent years, but it warrants renewed discussion.

War With Iran: Israel’s Legal Obligation to Prevent Iranian Nuclear Weapons

Israel is currently at war with Iran. Despite being non-nuclear, Iran could draw Israel into a protracted conflict involving "only" conventional missile and drone weaponry. Quickly, any such conflict in which both sides would seek "escala-tion dominance" and wherein the Israeli side might not be sufficiently advan-taged could compel a time-urgent decision in Jerusalem: (1) threaten calibrat-ed and plausible nuclear reprisals, or (2) submit to seemingly interminable at-trition warfare. Though the first option would amount to making threats of "asymmetrical nuclear war," it could still represent the most rational and cu-mulatively humane approach to Israeli national survival. In the final analysis, Israel can only succeed in its current war if it prevents Iranian nuclearization.

Palestinian Arabs in the Context of Russia’s Demand for Leadership of the Global South and Conflict with the West

Vladimir Putin’s second presidential term (2004–2008) was marked by Moscow’s obvious desire to regain its status as a global superpower, which had been lost by the Soviet Union as a result of its defeat in the Cold War. The point of official departure from the former policy of open partnership with Western countries and close cooperation with NATO was the so-called 2007 Munich Speech of the Russian President and the invasion of Georgia that followed in August 2008.

The Future of Hamas and the War in Gaza After the Sinwar Era

Yahya Sinwar was the individual most closely associated with Hamas and with the war initiated by that organization on October 7, 2023. On that date, Hamas terrorists swarmed across the Israeli border, killed approximately 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and kidnapped approximately 250 more to the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s elimination on October 17, 2024, is an image of Israeli victory. A year after the outbreak of the war and after the recent elimination of Sinwar, Hamas is now at a crossroads. Will its new leadership accept an arrangement that returns the abductees, ends the war, and brings the group’s rule in the Gaza Strip to an end? Or will Hamas continue along Sinwar’s lines - a futile war against Israel that will lead to yet further suffering for the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza?

Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Friendship Between Russia and Hamas Through the Prism of Russian Militarists

To position itself in the Muslim world, Russia needs to openly sympathize with the Palestinians, and close relations with Iran in the energy and military sectors make close ties with Israel difficult.

Mahmoud Abbas’ Visit to Moscow: Who Needs Him There and Why?

Moscow’s stand in the current sprawling regional military conflict in the Middle East is, at the very least, political and diplomatic support for the Arab proxies of Iran, while at the same time positioning itself as the patron of the still symbolically significant for the Arab-Islamic world “Palestinian Arab cause” as a whole.

A Sustainable Strategy: Principles for Updating Israel’s Strategy and Security Concept

In the aftermath of October 7, there is a clear need to reexamine Israel’s principles of defense. It is already clear that a considerable military build-up and additional investments will be required. However, we must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. More of the same – the restoration of a strategy based on deterrence, greater firepower, a wider order of forces, and more durable fortifications – may prove unsatisfactory and even distracting. This study seeks to contribute to the formulation of a sustainable strategy. We will do this not by citing principles that should be added to the concept of security but by addressing the type of discussion that is required. Along the way we will question some of the automatic responses to the crisis.

War With Iran: Israel’s Legal Obligation to Prevent Iranian Nuclear Weapons

Although the war in Gaza is still in its early stages, Israel must begin learning from it now. The next challenge, a war in the north, might be imminent. The primary lesson taught by the war in Gaza is that no military-size terror threat should ever again be allowed anywhere on Israel’s borders. Such threats should be removed by force on the other side of the border. A concentrated force-design process, focused on four or five plans, in addition to basic preparations will enable the creation of a sharper and readier military force. Israel should focus on embarking on about two years’ worth of preparations for the next war.

Israel’s Conduct of the War After October 7: Is This Carelessness or Wrongdoing?

Israel's main objective in the Iron Swords War is to topple the Hamas regime – an ambitious goal that seeks to change the political-strategic reality in Gaza. To achieve it, international cooperation is required to ensure legitimacy for the new regime as well as funding for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, establishment of its civilian administration, transfer of Gazan public servants to a new employer, de-radicalization, and internal security. The war must therefore be conducted by a coalition. Indeed, the war began with an unprecedented alignment of the United States, the West, and moderate Arab countries on Israel's side. But Israel’s refusal to conduct a dialogue with the international partners on the nature of the regime that will replace Hamas, foot-dragging on the humanitarian issue, extremist messaging, and poor management of the legal dimension have resulted in severe damage to Israel's legitimacy and ability to harness the international community’s help in achieving the war's objectives. The damage was done with no associated gains, as the Israeli government's conduct has steered it away from, rather than toward, achieving the goals of the war. Unless there is a profound change in the way the government conducts itself (and if it is not already too late), Israel's situation in the coming years will be worse than it was before the war.

Official Russia’s Interpretation of the Terms “Genocide” and “Holocaust” : Between Israel And Ukraine

Russian authorities continue dialogue with Israel and leave themselves the possibility to change their approach at any time if this corresponds to their interests in the constantly changing situation. This is typical of Putin's style of Realpolitik in foreign policy.