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IDF

Israel’s May 2000 rushed evacuation of its security zone in south Lebanon and the desertion of its longstanding local allies there tarnished the Jewish State’s deterrent posture and helped spark a string of large-scale armed confrontations with Hezbollah (2006), the PLO (the so-called “al-Aqsa Intifada”), and Hamas (2008/9, 2012, 2014). The withdrawal transformed south Lebanon into an ineradicable terror entity that can harass northern Israel at will and expedited Hezbollah’s evolvement into a formidable military power armed with 150,000 rockets and missiles capable of reaching anywhere in Israel. It also dented the IDF’s fighting ethos and operational competence, as illustrated by its lukewarm performance during the Second Lebanon War (2006) and Operation Protective Edge (2014).
After a year of planning, including a thorough and at times painful ”self MRI scan,” the IDF has set itself the target of creating a networked force that can destroy enemy capabilities in as little time and at as low a cost as possible. According to its new multi-year Momentum program, the IDF has changed its definition of victory, marking a significant and potentially extremely fruitful shift in military thinking.
Combat in well defended built-up areas and in underground fortified facilities requires a large-scale order of battle quantitatively greater than anything known in the past. Meeting this challenge depends on the right integration of an elite, top-quality strike force with a large-scale quantitative mass at a medium level of quality. And while the IDF has been renewing and strengthening itself in those regards, when it comes to ground combat, where a quantitative mass is critical, a worrisome gap is widening.
Ever since the 2006 war, Israel has preferred to contain Hezbollah rather than fight it directly. So determined was Israel to avoid going to war with the terrorist group that it tolerated its significant military buildup. Since 2012, however, the IAF has carried out hundreds of sorties inside Syria aimed at stopping the delivery of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. Israel can continue to delay the arming of Hezbollah, but it has already become quite strong, and a war could occur even if neither side wants it.
While few in Israel expect a major escalation to follow Trump’s announcement of the “Deal of the Century”, the IDF is conducting ongoing situation assessments to keep its finger on the pulse. The Israeli defense establishment is preparing to study the details of the proposal closely to see what conclusions can be drawn in terms of potential security ramifications.

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