Mowing the Grass in Gaza

and | July 20, 2014

Against an implacable, well-entrenched, non-state enemy like the Hamas, Israel needs to “mow the grass” once in a while in order to degrade enemy capabilities

A Gaza Ceasefire Now Would Be a Strategic Miss

| July 15, 2014

Israel didn’t effect a significant change in the security balance versus Hamas in the Gaza Strip. A draw with the Hamas is strategically unsatisfactory.

The Jordan Valley is Israel’s Only Defensible Eastern Border

| April 14, 2014

Israel has a natural right to, and an internationally recognized need for, defensible borders. The Jordan Valley is the only truly defensible eastern border for Israel, says a former IDF deputy chief of staff and national security adviser.

Neglect of IDF Ground Forces: A Risk to Israel’s Security

and | December 4, 2013

Dramatic cuts to the IDF budget have forced the army to reduce its ground forces capabilities. This is a mistake, as the IDF still must rely on its ground forces to deal with its threats, specifically Hamas and Hizballah.

Mowing the Grass: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

and | December 1, 2013

“Mowing the Grass” is Israel’s strategy for a protracted intractable conflict. Only after showing restraint in its military responses does Israel act to destroy enemy capabilities, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect to create quiet along its borders.

Israel vs. the Iran-Hizballah Axis

| November 14, 2013

The IDF and the Iran-Hizballah axis are in the midst of a long-term military build-up, preparing for the possibility of a full-scale eruption of the ongoing covert struggle between them.

Forty Years to the Yom Kippur War

| October 2, 2013

The Israeli victory in 1973 was marred by pain over casualties and disappointment with the country’s leadership. Forty years later, Israel prospers as a powerful nation with a strong, resilient society.

Where Is the Israeli Military Heading?

| August 7, 2013

The army’s new multi-year plan shows a reorganizing of priorities for the coming decade, with a focus on intelligence, active defense systems, cyber warfare, and border protection. The ground forces will be downgraded in importance and priority.

Can the IDF Afford a Small Army?

| July 18, 2013

The IDF must take into consideration that a smaller military comes with a price, as even low-intensity conflicts require a large number of troops to enable the army to succeed.

Why the Schalit Decision Makes Military Sense

| October 27, 2011

The Schalit prisoner exchange was a rational and sensible recognition of the need to reaffirm society’s commitment to the welfare of its soldiers. The obligation of the state is even more pronounced in Israel’s case, as the IDF is a conscript army, in which far from all draft-age youngsters in fact serve.