In June 2024, the materials published by the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program covered the recent developments in the South Caucasus, as well as the projections of the regional dynamics on the geopolitical stances of Israel and France.
Gela Vasadze provides an analysis of the recent months’ political protests in Armenia. The protests against the incumbent government of Nikol Pashinyan were caused by the loss of Nagorno Karabakh in 2023, and the immediate reason is the recent decision to hand over the four deserted villages to Azerbaijan. Vasadze highlights the importance of miatsum (the idea of a “unification” between Armenia and Karabakh) for the political platforms of the worldwide Armenian diaspora and the role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the diasporic structures. The protest leader, Archbishop Bagrat of the Diocese of Tavush, has close ties to the former Karabakh authorities. The current protest wave resembles the rallies of 2018 that brought Nikol Pashinyan, the incumbent PM, to power. However, Archbishop Bagrat and his allies have no positive agenda, they rely only on the (understandable) negative emotions and ressentiment, while the physical impossibility of “returning” Karabakh is evident.
Velvl Chernin discusses the differences between the ethnopolitical situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the perspectives for the peaceful reintegration of these occupied territories into Georgia. Rumors circulate in the regional capitals about the Georgian leadership’s turn towards Russia and promotion of the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” being possibly a “payment for the ‘surrender’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. However, Abkhazia has a long tradition of statehood and the mournful experience of ethnic cleansing of the local Georgians (which “allowed” to increase the share of Abkhazians in the region’s population from 18 percent in 1989 to 51 percent in 2016). Also, the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey might serve as a potential demographic resource. In contrast, Ossetians came to the Georgian lands only in the late Middle Ages and settled among the Georgians. No ethnic cleansing took place in South Ossetia, and before the Russian aggression of 2008, Georgian schools were functioning there. The population of the self-proclaimed republic is very small, just 53,000 (2016; compared to 98,500 in 1989). Taking all the above into account, Chernin concludes that, if peaceful reintegration of South Ossetia into “Georgia proper” is possible, for Abkhazia it might prove extremely problematic because of the specifics of “national consciousness and heavy memories of the 1992-1993 war.”
Konstantin Pakhalyuk presented his vision of the rhetorical escalation undertaken by the French authorities concerning the potential involvement of France in the Russian-Ukrainian war. While admitting the role of President Macron’s possible personal ressentiment over the failed pre-war negotiating attempts and the necessity to somehow cover up for the fact of the comparatively low French investments in support for Ukraine, Pakhalyuk points to more strategic goals France might envision at the moment. The French authorities are now one of the main discursive drivers behind the idea of the “strategic autonomy of Europe,” “securitization of democracy,” and the development of the European defense industry. At the same time, the Fifth Republic tries to extend its geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet area, targeting mostly Armenia and Moldova by increasing bilateral military and economic ties.
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman and Ze’ev Khanin analyze the use of such terms as “genocide” and “Holocaust” by the Kremlin. “On the one hand, Russian authorities, in their rhetoric, actively support accusations against Israel of genocide in the context of the war in Gaza. (…) Primarily, Israel in this case plays the role of the ‘enemy image’, which helps Russia consolidate the ‘global South’ against the West (and Israel) and solve a number of instrumental tasks related to military actions in Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russian leadership is returning to the old Soviet rhetoric of ‘soft denial’ of the Holocaust basically with the same purpose. Therefore, the new concept of the ‘genocide of the Soviet people’ is introduced. Within its framework, the suffering of Jews during World War II is ‘dissolved’ in the general context of losses of citizens of the USSR.” The authors state that, following the tradition of Realpolitik, the Kremlin tries to preserve some elements of post-Soviet Russia’s image of a neutral power equally detached from both Israel and Palestinian groups. For this purpose, the Russian authorities still try to maintain a certain level of dialogue with Jerusalem. However, “the real opportunities for any deals between Moscow and Jerusalem are slim, while Russia continues to actively use the rhetoric of ‘genocide of Palestinians by Israel’ and elements of neo-Soviet soft Holocaust denial doctrine.”
Finally, on June 27th, 2024, the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program organized a seminar titled “Vectors and Cleavages of Post-Soviet Conflict Dynamics”. A summary of the presentations may be found on the BESA website. And our Program will continue updating the readership on the most recent developments in the countries of the former Soviet region.