PSCRP-BESA Reports No 64 (June 13, 2024)
Confrontation and Leadership
At the end of February 2024, after a conference of leaders from 20 European states in Paris, where the question of providing military assistance to Ukraine was discussed, French President Emmanuel Macron made a resonant statement that he did not rule out sending troops there. The United States and NATO rushed to distance themselves from his words, and in early May, the French leader himself clarified that he meant the situation if Russia were to breach the defensive positions of the Ukrainian armed forces. The next stage of political-rhetorical escalation was rather missed by Paris: the first to step forward was London, which in May declared that it allowed the use of supplied weapons to strike at Russian territory. Towards the end of the month, such statements were made by the United States, and after them – Germany and France. However, the latter once again took the lead: on May 27, the president stated the possibility of sending military advisers to Ukraine.
Only partly this rhetorical escalation was stimulated by the dynamics of the Russo-Ukrainian war, namely concerns about a spring offensive and the opening of the Kharkiv front. Undoubtedly, the future of conventional armed conflict depends directly on the situation on the battlefield, however, as military analyst Nikolai Mitrokhin noted, Russia’s offensive by the end of May stalled, bringing it only individual tactical successes. And the Kharkiv front stretched both Russian and Ukrainian reserves. At the same time, Ukrainian drones began to strike more and more deep into Russia, including strategic missile defense objects.
If the key military assistance to Ukraine comes from the United States and Germany, then France’s rhetorical militancy diverges from reality: in February 2024, Berlin signed agreements on military supplies worth 7.1 billion euros, while France only signed for 3 billion, which is comparable to the commitments of 2 billion from such a small country as the Netherlands. Overall, over the course of two years of war, a quarter of all European aid went to Germany (approximately 10 billion euros), while only 6.5% went to France (2.69 billion euros). However, according to modern analysts’ estimates, EU assistance in 2024 even exceeded American assistance, although out of the promised 144 billion euros, Ukraine received only 77 billion euros.
Emmanuel Macron’s militant statements should not only be seen as an attempt to cover up the fact that France is clearly not a leader among Ukraine’s donors. One cannot exclude Macron’s own resentment, whose peace efforts before the Russian invasion were unsuccessful. Moreover, Russia has already played on anti-French sentiments in Africa and the attempts of the Élysée Palace itself to rebuild relations in this direction, which resulted in France’s accelerated displacement from Mali and Burkina Faso (2021-2022). The burden of fighting Islamists and creating even minimally effective states has now been taken over by new military leaders supported by Moscow. The military coup in Niger in the summer of 2023 was an unpleasant surprise for Paris: the new authorities demanded the withdrawal of French troops, which dealt a blow to plans to use this country as a main base for its military in West Africa.
However, in reality, the issue is more acute: on the one hand, by getting rid of “bad” African assets, with the other hand, Macron tries to strengthen active “good” assets, namely European ones. In the end, there are significant funds backing the militarization of the EU on a pan-European scale. And the interests of the French military-industrial complex play a significant role here. If in 2019, under the auspices of the European Commission, a pan-European program for the development of the defense industry with a financing volume of 500 million euros was launched, then in 2022, the European Defense Fund with a budget of 8 billion euros appeared (until 2027).
But attention should also be paid to the political circumstances. 2022 became the year of the “return of history”: true, by this one should understand not the emergence of a real alternative to the liberal-democratic model of development, but rather the need for efforts to protect it. Russian military entrepreneurship may not be a model of development, but this system is quite stable and also has a certain attractiveness in the eyes of some dictators and population groups in various countries of the world who, for various reasons, are close to the idea of state paternalism. In practical terms, this means containing Russia, maintaining Europe as a space of stability and development, and granting the EU the status of one of the military and political centers.
Therefore, one should take seriously the activation of French diplomacy in recent months, trying on behalf of the EU to negotiate on global arena, and the programmatic speech of Emmanuel Macron in the Sorbonne at the end of April 2024, where he reiterated his words about the need to ensure “strategic autonomy” for Europe. The protracted Russo-Ukrainian war, on the one hand, sharply raises the question of the military capacity of the EU, and on the other hand, opens up prospects in those countries where, even in the late 2010s, Moscow’s influence was quite strong. In particular, we are talking about Moldova and Armenia, with which France concluded a series of military agreements in the fall of 2023 – spring of 2024.
The Caucasus Region
For decades, Russia has played the role of a power mediator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation. In 2020, it, supported by Turkey, acted as a guarantor of agreements between these countries after Karabakh war. The prolonged full-scale aggression against Ukraine has limited Russia’s ability to project military power in other regions. To this, two additional factors should be added: the reluctance of Armenian political leaders led by Nikol Pashinyan to follow Moscow’s lead and Russia’s interest in a real “turn to the East”. Hence arises her close partnership with Iran and the exploration of creating a transport corridor through its territory. In these conditions, partnership with Azerbaijan is of particular importance for Russia, while the poorer and weaker Armenia can be sacrificed. In turn, Pashinyan’s policy symbolizes fatigue from military confrontations of the past decades and a rejection of the conditional idea of “Great Armenia” in favor of recognizing that modern Armenia territorially inherits a similar administrative unit within the USSR.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan restored control over Nagorno-Karabakh by force, leading to the voluntary exodus of over 120,000 people – all its Armenian inhabitants. Although Armenia’s leadership had previously recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over this region, the process of demarcating the border has not yet been completed, accompanied by fears among Armenians that Baku will revise it quite liberally in its favor. Against this backdrop, it was France that extended a hand of military-political assistance to the 2.8 million-strong Armenia: in October, a contract was signed for the supply of three radar stations to ensure air safety, as well as an agreement for future delivery of air defense missiles. In addition, a batch of armored vehicles and night vision devices was supplied. In February 2024, Armenia suspended its membership in the CSTO (a military-political alliance in the post-Soviet space led by Russia), and in May announced the cessation of its financing. Also in February, amid a visit by French Foreign Minister Sebastien Lecornu to Yerevan, cooperation – still limited—began in the field of training Armenian troops. The French side stated that if necessary, it is ready to provide Armenia with short- and medium-range air defense missiles. The gradual withdrawal of Russian border guards from Armenia and the peacekeeping contingent (already unnecessary) from Nagorno-Karabakh indicates a reduction in military presence, but Russian aviation still uses the Erebuni airbase near Yerevan, and the 102nd brigade is stationed in Gyumri (about 3–5 thousand people).
Although from the perspective of military-political security, Pashinyan’s government is reorienting towards France and the EU as a whole, Armenia remains dependent on Russia. Firstly, suspending membership in the CSTO is not equivalent to withdrawal from the organization, and rearming the army based on European, not Russian, standards takes time. Secondly, Armenia remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and benefits from close economic cooperation with Russia. According to Armenia’s state statistical committee, in 2022, the country’s exports amounted to $5.4 billion (of which $2.4 billion to Russia, $772 million to the EU, including only $9.8 million to France), imports – $8.7 billion (of which $2.6 billion from Russia, $1.5 billion from the EU, including $112 million from France). In 2023, Russia also remained a key economic partner of the country: exports to it increased to $3.38 billion, and reciprocal imports to $3.88 billion. However, in the current situation, Russia is not ready to use “economic leverage”: it is not in its interests to scatter remaining partners and even small markets. Accordingly, at present, the issue for France and the EU lies in finding effective mechanisms to expand military and economic cooperation with Armenia: in both cases, real achievements are still lagging behind rosy pro-European prospects.
Moldova Case
Following Armenia, the 2.5-million-strong Moldova came next: the autumn agreements of 2023 between Paris and Chisinau in early March 2024 resulted in full-fledged military and economic agreements. These followed the start of official negotiations on the country’s accession to the EU in February, which currently involve reviewing national legislation to align with pan-European standards. The signing of the Franco-Moldovan agreements was accompanied by calls not to allow the division of Moldovan society by Russia and to prevent its interference in the internal affairs of this country. In the military sphere, there is currently talk of supplying radar systems to Moldova, as well as creating a French military mission to train the Moldovan army.
For decades, Moldova has been characterized by balancing between Russia and the EU, but in the 2010s, the vector leaned towards the West. Thus, in 2016, the Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU entered into force, and in 2021, Maia Sandu became president, oriented towards cooperation with Brussels rather than Moscow. The Russian war against Ukraine only reinforced these trends. Thus, in 2023, the EU accounted for 53.7% of the country’s external trade, with Ukraine and China in second and third place, while Russia’s share decreased from 8.9% in 2019 to approximately 3.5% in 2023.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that Moldova remains a relatively poor, corrupt country. Stalling economic reforms have the strongest impact on Sandu’s rating, who faces reelection in October 2024, combined with a referendum on EU accession. In December 2023, according to IMAS, 34% supported her reelection, and in March 2024, 38%. Another poll in April 2024 also shows a split among citizens regarding the country’s path; while Sandu leads in trust ratings (46%), other politicians lag behind by about 10 percentage points. 56% would vote for EU accession.
Another risk factor is ethno-territorial conflicts. Approximately 1/5 of the population, predominantly ethnic Russians, lives in the Transnistrian region, traditionally seeing Russia as a patron. On the one hand, Russian peacekeepers continue to be present here, but on the other hand, after February 24, the leadership of Transnistria adopted neutrality, at least officially distancing itself from Putin’s foreign policy. Of course, Russian military radicals in their public fantasies do not even hide that the restoration of the Russian Empire involves not only the occupation of Ukraine but also the subsequent deployment of troops in Moldova. In their imagination, if not the entire country, then Transnistria is definitely an integral part of the “Russian world.” At the same time, Chisinau has intensified pressure on the unrecognized republic in 2023–early 2024, introducing criminal liability for separatism and then adopting a new customs code: now Transnistrian companies must pay duties to both the local and Moldovan budgets. At the very end of February 2024, Transnistria held a congress of deputies at all levels, the preparation of which was accompanied by a media hoax about an alleged request to Moscow to include this territory in Russia. It all ended with only calls for help, to which Moscow reacted quite dryly. This resembled a desperate attempt to somehow play the “Russian card” in conditions where the status quo established over decades is increasingly becoming history.
Traditionally, pro-Russian sentiments are strong in the southern province of Gagauzia (about 140,000 people), where half of the population is Turkic-speaking Gagauz people. In 2023, Evgeniya Gutsul, close to the party of the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, won local elections. Immediately after this, the Moldovan authorities declared her unconstitutional and banned her, and Gutsul, contrary to legislation, was not included in the Moldovan government. She does not hide her pro-Russian sympathies: in March 2024, she met with Putin and signed agreements to expand cooperation with Russian regions. On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that 70% of Gagauzia’s budget is formed through subsidies from Chisinau, while Turkey and the EU allocate significant sums for the development of local infrastructure. Additionally, the unified Europe consumes 42% of the local exports, whereas Russia only accounts for 8%. Thus, pro-Russian sentiments are also a profitable business, primarily oriented towards the West rather than Russia.
In the context of Moldova’s societal division, France’s actions primarily demonstrate support for the pro-Western government of Moldova, while cooperation on the military front is likely aimed at preventing an unlikely but potentially possible crisis situation if Russia decides to push its supporters towards more aggressive street-level confrontation.
Securitization of democracy
The strengthening role of France as a security guarantor for Armenia and Moldova is part of a broader pan-European trend associated with the amplification of security issues and the securitization of economic stability, development, and democracy. The displacement of Russia from these countries, while undoubtedly a political blow to Moscow, does not undermine its strategic stability. These are relatively small and poor states. However, conversely, any failures of France and the EU here threaten to result in political costs. It is impossible to claim a global political role if you cannot retain two countries with a population of less than 6 million in your orbit. Still, the main point is to outline those political structures of the future that correspond to the idea that power-based confrontation with Russia is a long-term factor.
In recent months, French diplomacy has actively sought to assert its claims to a key role on the global stage overall: negotiations with Japan on military cooperation, balancing relations with China, and strengthening its position in the Indo-Pacific region. However, such positioning currently depends heavily, oddly enough, on the ability of Ukrainians to fight on the battlefield, which includes the readiness of the US and the EU to support them. The agenda includes the question of greater involvement of European countries in ensuring Ukraine’s security, and thus their own strategic security. However, in practical terms, this entails increased defense spending, which imposes a heavy burden on the economy. In the context of almost zero economic growth in 2023 (0.4% for the EU as a whole and 1.1% in France), the growth of state investments in the military sector may indeed be seen as a way to stimulate it, but whether this will lead to economic development is a separate question.