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The IDF’s Gamble in Lebanon

Israel’s move in the north signals a clear strategy - the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy's ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror – however successful they may be – are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israel’s approach to defeating Hezbollah.

The Future of Hamas and the War in Gaza After the Sinwar Era

Yahya Sinwar was the individual most closely associated with Hamas and with the war initiated by that organization on October 7, 2023. On that date, Hamas terrorists swarmed across the Israeli border, killed approximately 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and kidnapped approximately 250 more to the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s elimination on October 17, 2024, is an image of Israeli victory. A year after the outbreak of the war and after the recent elimination of Sinwar, Hamas is now at a crossroads. Will its new leadership accept an arrangement that returns the abductees, ends the war, and brings the group’s rule in the Gaza Strip to an end? Or will Hamas continue along Sinwar’s lines - a futile war against Israel that will lead to yet further suffering for the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza?

From Oslo to Be’eri: How the 30-Year Peace Delusion Led to the October 7 Hamas Massacres by Efraim Karsh

The following study was written by Prof. Efraim Karsh, former Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and Professor Emeritus of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King's College London. Prof. Karsh is the former Director of the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia, where he edited the journal Middle East Quarterly from 2010 through 2023. He is the founding editor of the journal Israel Affairs and founding general editor of the Routledge book series Israeli History, Politics and Society. He is the author of sixteen books and over 100 scholarly articles. The failure to prevent Hamas’s slaughter of some 1,300 Israelis on 7 October 2023 – the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust – is a direct result of an emergency phone consultation three hours before the terror group’s invasion of Israel with the participation of the IDF’s and Shin Bet’s top leaders, who decided to do nothing despite acute warning signals and failed to alert the Gaza division commander and the political echelon to the imminent attack. Had they taken the minimal precautionary measures, the catastrophe would have been averted altogether. To fully understand the mindset underlying this monumental blunder requires tracing its evolution within the context of the 30-years-long Oslo peace delusion in general, and during the turbulent year preceding the 7 October massacres in particular. That is: the substitution of a grand strategic deception aimed at Israel’s destruction for a true peace process and the attendant emasculation of the IDF’s military capabilities and combative/offensive ethos, on the one hand, and the unravelling of Israel’s sociopolitical fabric that culminated in the 2023 mass civil disobedience that enticed Hamas into action, on the other. Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposed the Oslo process from the outset and managed to neutralise its most catastrophic potential calamity – the establishment of a Palestinian state committed to Israel’s destruction in the West Bank and Gaza – failed to extricate Israel from this disastrous course and was ironically forced to bear its full brunt on 7 October 2023.

Israel: The Making of a Global Cyber Power

In the aftermath of October 7, there is a clear need to reexamine Israel’s principles of defense. It is already clear that a considerable military build-up and additional investments will be required. However, we must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. More of the same – the restoration of a strategy based on deterrence, greater firepower, a wider order of forces, and more durable fortifications – may prove unsatisfactory and even distracting. This study seeks to contribute to the formulation of a sustainable strategy. We will do this not by citing principles that should be added to the concept of security but by addressing the type of discussion that is required. Along the way we will question some of the automatic responses to the crisis.

India and Japan Are Balancing the Indo-Pacific Region and the Global Arena

The current strengthening of relations between India and Japan demonstrates a change in both countries’ foreign and security policy. Each side sees the other as an important element in balancing China and creating an alliance that could replace the US, should it ultimately decide to retreat from Asia. New Delhi and Tokyo have expanded cooperation in security and economic sectors, participated in joint military exercises, and engaged actively in the Quad forum, which is aimed at countering the Chinese threat and maintaining regional stability. Japan's defense policy changes and the growing US presence in the Indo-Pacific support this partnership, reinforcing their joint commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

The Gaza Oil Myth

The claim that Israel’s war in Gaza is driven by a desire to control Gaza's oil and gas resources has spread widely on social media and news platforms over the past year. However, Gaza has no known oil reserves and only one small, undeveloped offshore gas field, which Israel has never claimed. Surprisingly, this disinformation traces back to an official 2019 report by a UN agency (UNCTAD) that contained numerous false statements and unsubstantiated figures about non-existent energy reserves that were provided to it by known conspiracy theorists. Despite multiple analyses debunking every part of the report, the UN has not retracted it. This article examines the sources of the Gaza oil myth and points to deliberate attempts by the UNCTAD to fuel the false narrative of Israel seizing non-existent Palestinian oil.

Is the Aphrodite Gas Field
Politically Viable?

The companies that share ownership of the Aphrodite gas field announced on September 1, 2024 that they have submitted an updated development plan to the Cypriot government and are awaiting its approval. They estimate its cost to be around $4 billion. The announcement was preceded by months of fraught discussion between the companies, led by the US company Chevron, and the Cypriot Minister of Energy. If the development of the field can move forward successfully, it has the potential to redound to Israel’s benefit.

Japan, South Korea and the US Elections

The US presidential election in November 2024 will have a major impact on Asia. It will influence the US military presence as well as the balance of power in the region, and will affect the economies of the Asian countries. Joe Biden’s decision to leave the race and the elevation of Kamala Harris as the Democratic party candidate have forced Tokyo and Seoul to recalculate their policies towards Washington and the region.

Not an End State but a Long Game:
Israel’s Strategic Goals in the Iron Swords War

Many commentators claim that Israel lacks a clear plan for “the day after” the end of the Iron Swords War. They argue that because of this supposed lack, Israel will not be able to hold onto its military achievements during the war, which will remain merely tactical. But Israel is not playing a short-term game. Beyond its declared war goals, Israel is aiming to create a new security reality in the region by weakening Iran and its proxies. This broader goal stems from the understanding that to Israel, this war is existential, and the removal of significant threats from Israel’s borders is non-negotiable. Israel understands that it cannot impose plans or political proposals on its opponents, be they Palestinian or Lebanese – but by demonstrating its clear military superiority over them, Israel will improve its position in future negotiations. Finally, there is potential for new regional arrangements, including normalization with more Arab countries, if Israel succeeds in significantly weakening the Iranian threat. If Israel can show potential allies major military achievements against a common enemy, it can suggest a political plan that will improve its position in the region – but not before then. For Israel there is no end game, only a long game.

The New York Times Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War:
Random Errors or Endemic Malaise?

Serious errors, vague corrections and omissions of information have appeared in the pages of The New York Times throughout the Israel-Hamas war. The Times is considered a “newspaper of record” and a reliable source of information, and is read by leaders and elites around the world. The paper has nevertheless committed a series of repeated errors about the war, invariably at Israel’s expense, despite editorial promises to apply extra scrutiny. The errors and omissions created false context and lacked transparency. This report focuses on the Al-Ahli Hospital explosion, reports of civilian casualties, the Times’s continued employment of questionable journalists, and testimonials from inside the newsroom.