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In world politics, it would seem obvious that sanity is better than madness. Upon reflection, however, the risks of nuclear war could be as high or higher among “sane” adversaries. For Israel, a country smaller than America’s Lake Michigan, a failure to understand this counterintuitive truth could hasten the onset of unprecedented hostilities with Iran. Most ominously, it could mean Israel’s eventually suffering an Iranian nuclear attack.
Israel’s flawed strategy of deterring and appeasing its adversaries has had a negative impact on military thinking. In recent decades, the border fence has turned from a tactical measure into a mental barrier. The fence was seen to distinguish between “their territory” and “our territory,” or between a dangerous space and an apparently safe one. The lesson of the failure of October 7 is not to erect stronger obstacles. We have built border barriers in the north and south many times over the decades, and they always fail. A border is a political concept, not a military one. The relevant military concept is a “front.” A front, on both sides of the border, is a challenging combat space that requires tactical independence for the forces, especially in the areas of combat gathering, fire support and air defense.
Erdoğan's threat that Turkey will enter Israel, as it did Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, is one of the most serious statements in the history of Israel-Turkey relations. This article describes the political context and background of this threat and explores what might be behind it and where it may lead in the relations between the countries. It analyzes the political and economic challenges Erdoğan is facing, with a focus on Turkey's foreign policy in recent years. While Erdoğan's threats should be taken seriously, it is unlikely that they will materialize at this stage, though it is important to keep a close watch on Turkey's actions in the future.
What core intelligence challenges did Israel fail to meet in the lead-up to October 7? Israeli intelligence, in concert with policymakers, missed the disruptive terrorist “innovation” in Hamas’s strategy toward Israel. This error was facilitated by a related failure to implement existing intelligence across organizational levels. The calamitous intelligence failure that culminated in the events of October 7 illustrates Yakov Ben-Haim’s info-gap theory, which states that commitment to a policy paradoxically increases when the level of what needs to be known is lowered. This allows for the growth of a dangerous tolerance for gaps in information. In Israel’s case, this tolerance blinded the intelligence services and policymakers to disruptive changes in Hamas’s intentions, capabilities and application of resources.
In recent years, energy security has become a central issue for many countries, not least those that suffer from political and energy isolation. The Iron Swords War has greatly sharpened Israel’s need for a solution to the problem of damage to, or shortages in, electricity supply in times of crisis. The close relationship that has developed over the past decade between Israel, Greece and Cyprus enables and encourages projects of this kind. One project that has been on the table in recent years is an electrical cable that would connect the three countries. This is an ambitious and expensive project with quite a few question marks regarding its practicality. However, under the circumstances, it is essential to move this strategic issue from policy statements to action. It is time to make decisions and allocate budgets to take advantage of the political opportunity provided by the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek triangle to come up with the kind of energy solution Israel urgently needs.
An Israeli offensive in Lebanon has to be militarily decisive. The removal of the Hezbollah threat is the only possible enabler of a reliable agreement. The punishment approach, which some still preach, has been proven ineffective. Lebanese "state responsibility" rhymes with the discredited notion of a "weakened and deterred Hamas." The IDF, built for decades on the premise of fighting non-decisive stand-off operations, is not ready for a decisive war, especially after nine long and exhausting months. A supreme national effort to end the current campaign and renew the crushing power of the IDF is now urgently needed. The aim should be to defeat Hezbollah, including complementary efforts in the south, after a two- to three-year period of emergency preparations for the next war.
On May 5 of this year, India and Iran announced the renewal of their partnership at Chabahar Port in southeastern Iran. The strategic port is India's gateway to Central Asia and Northern Europe. Its great importance stems from the fact that it allows India to bypass Pakistan's ports and challenge the Chinese "Pearls" program, which seeks to seize central ports in the global system. After more than 20 years of negotiations that had their ups and downs due to the international sanctions on Iran, the countries signed an agreement for the development and operation of the port for 10 years. The announcement of the revival of the partnership gives us an opportunity to examine the complexity of the relationship between the two countries and the implications of this partnership for Israel and the global system.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has posed a direct challenge to the national sovereignty of an independent country, just as it continues to lead to extensive suffering, especially due to the attacks on civilian infrastructure. Yet beyond these direct consequences for Ukraine and the Ukrainians, the invasion represents nothing less than an assault on the established international order, an effort to redraw recognized state borders through the use of force.

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