Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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Madness, Sanity and Nuclear War in the Middle East

In world politics, it would seem obvious that sanity is better than madness. Upon reflection, however, the risks of nuclear war could be as high or higher among “sane” adversaries. For Israel, a country smaller than America’s Lake Michigan, a failure to understand this counterintuitive truth could hasten the onset of unprecedented hostilities with Iran. Most ominously, it could mean Israel’s eventually suffering an Iranian nuclear attack.

It’s Not a Border. It’s a Front.

Israel’s flawed strategy of deterring and appeasing its adversaries has had a negative impact on military thinking. In recent decades, the border fence has turned from a tactical measure into a mental barrier. The fence was seen to distinguish between “their territory” and “our territory,” or between a dangerous space and an apparently safe one. The lesson of the failure of October 7 is not to erect stronger obstacles. We have built border barriers in the north and south many times over the decades, and they always fail. A border is a political concept, not a military one. The relevant military concept is a “front.” A front, on both sides of the border, is a challenging combat space that requires tactical independence for the forces, especially in the areas of combat gathering, fire support and air defense.

Erdoğan, You Can’t Sail a Ship with Words*

Erdoğan's threat that Turkey will enter Israel, as it did Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, is one of the most serious statements in the history of Israel-Turkey relations. This article describes the political context and background of this threat and explores what might be behind it and where it may lead in the relations between the countries. It analyzes the political and economic challenges Erdoğan is facing, with a focus on Turkey's foreign policy in recent years. While Erdoğan's threats should be taken seriously, it is unlikely that they will materialize at this stage, though it is important to keep a close watch on Turkey's actions in the future.

Predicting the Unpredictable: Anticipating Disruptive Terrorist “Innovation”

What core intelligence challenges did Israel fail to meet in the lead-up to October 7? Israeli intelligence, in concert with policymakers, missed the disruptive terrorist “innovation” in Hamas’s strategy toward Israel. This error was facilitated by a related failure to implement existing intelligence across organizational levels. The calamitous intelligence failure that culminated in the events of October 7 illustrates Yakov Ben-Haim’s info-gap theory, which states that commitment to a policy paradoxically increases when the level of what needs to be known is lowered. This allows for the growth of a dangerous tolerance for gaps in information. In Israel’s case, this tolerance blinded the intelligence services and policymakers to disruptive changes in Hamas’s intentions, capabilities and application of resources.

War in the North, the Defense Budget, and Strategy

An Israeli offensive in Lebanon has to be militarily decisive. The removal of the Hezbollah threat is the only possible enabler of a reliable agreement. The punishment approach, which some still preach, has been proven ineffective. Lebanese "state responsibility" rhymes with the discredited notion of a "weakened and deterred Hamas." The IDF, built for decades on the premise of fighting non-decisive stand-off operations, is not ready for a decisive war, especially after nine long and exhausting months. A supreme national effort to end the current campaign and renew the crushing power of the IDF is now urgently needed. The aim should be to defeat Hezbollah, including complementary efforts in the south, after a two- to three-year period of emergency preparations for the next war.

The Iron Swords War: The Strategic Balance So Far and What’s Next

Ten months after the surprise attack by Hamas on October 7, it is possible to assess the strategic achievements of the antagonists. In addition to inflicting heavy casualties and many wounded on the Israelis, Hamas succeeded in undermining Israeli society and causing divisions within it on the issue of the hostages. Hamas also succeeded in undermining Israel’s international status. Israel’s economic situation has been severely damaged and continues to deteriorate. Hamas brought the Palestinian issue back to center stage as a condition for a regional settlement, and recruited the Iranian proxies, mainly Hezbollah and the Houthis, for a war of attrition against Israel. Perhaps its greatest achievement is the evacuation of the populations of Jewish settlements within sovereign Israel for the first time since the establishment of the state. On the other hand, Israel is on the verge of crushing Hamas as an organized military force and removing one front from the “ring of fire" created by Iran around Israel. The Iranian attack on Israel proved the effective cooperation of a regional military coalition under the leadership of US Central Command and proved that Israel has an effective defense system against ballistic missiles. Israel regained its trust in the major ground maneuver and reserve soldiers were reestablished as an effective force in the IDF. Civil society also demonstrated its ability to mobilize. Hamas was unable to mobilize the Israeli Arabs to join it nor to mobilize the West Bank for a significant uprising. At this point, Israel is faced with a difficult dilemma. However, it is possible that a major strategic shift in events, should one occur, will not be related to regional developments but to developments in the global order, as has happened before in the region’s history.

Chabahar Port – India’s Entrance into Geopolitical Influence

On May 5 of this year, India and Iran announced the renewal of their partnership at Chabahar Port in southeastern Iran. The strategic port is India's gateway to Central Asia and Northern Europe. Its great importance stems from the fact that it allows India to bypass Pakistan's ports and challenge the Chinese "Pearls" program, which seeks to seize central ports in the global system. After more than 20 years of negotiations that had their ups and downs due to the international sanctions on Iran, the countries signed an agreement for the development and operation of the port for 10 years. The announcement of the revival of the partnership gives us an opportunity to examine the complexity of the relationship between the two countries and the implications of this partnership for Israel and the global system.

How to Win the Thirty Years’ War with Iran

Israeli history must be retold as a sequence of three long historical wars. The Iron Swords War does not stand on its own. The campaign in Gaza is a critical transition stage, both conceptual and practical, during which Israel is moving from defense to offense in a long war with Iran's proxies. To realize its achievements, Israel needs a pause of a few years during which the strategy and military power for the offensive will be formulated. True learning is required at the political and military levels, and national reconciliation is required. Decisive emergency steps will have to be taken to build a military power that is more suitable to the broader war.

From the Battle of Badr to Military Defeat: Changes in Hamas Perceptions of the Gaza War

The Hamas invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 was quickly characterized by Hamas as fulfillment of a prophecy about the destruction of Israel. Hamas cast the invasion as a Palestinian version of the Battle of Badr, a battle in which a small force of Muslim believers under the command of the Prophet Muhammad succeeded in defeating a large force of Quraysh and Makkah who had opposed his prophecy. The battles of October 7 were labeled a divine victory by believers over the enemies of Allah, and many verses in this spirit were broadcast. However, more recent articles published on the Hamas website suggest that its view has undergone a transformation. Hamas has apparently shifted from extolling its “divine victory” on October 7 to admitting that it has been defeated in battle again and again. The great suffering Hamas has inflicted on the Gaza Strip has put it in the position where it must now explain to the Palestinian public why it started the war in the first place, why it did not expect a massive military response from Israel to its atrocities and attempt at genocide, and why the suffering of the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip is not in vain.

Five Alternatives for the Future of Gaza

In this article I will present five alternatives for the future of Gaza. Israel’s long-term strategy to ensure its continued existence entails the accomplishment of these goals: destruction of Hamas's military capabilities, abolition of Hamas control in Gaza, and the preservation of good relations with the United States. Less core strategic considerations are the return of the abductees, the crisis on the northern front, relations within the region, and Israel’s legitimacy. The alternatives for Gaza’s future are: the Hamas option, which is the most problematic; the revitalized Palestinian Authority option; the military-civilian option, which seems the most balanced; the chaos option; and the sovereignty option, which is also very problematic. It is essential to conduct a far-reaching discussion on all these alternatives and to avoid attachment to any one of them.