Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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Israeli history must be retold as a sequence of three long historical wars. The Iron Swords War does not stand on its own. The campaign in Gaza is a critical transition stage, both conceptual and practical, during which Israel is moving from defense to offense in a long war with Iran's proxies. To realize its achievements, Israel needs a pause of a few years during which the strategy and military power for the offensive will be formulated. True learning is required at the political and military levels, and national reconciliation is required. Decisive emergency steps will have to be taken to build a military power that is more suitable to the broader war.
The Hamas invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 was quickly characterized by Hamas as fulfillment of a prophecy about the destruction of Israel. Hamas cast the invasion as a Palestinian version of the Battle of Badr, a battle in which a small force of Muslim believers under the command of the Prophet Muhammad succeeded in defeating a large force of Quraysh and Makkah who had opposed his prophecy. The battles of October 7 were labeled a divine victory by believers over the enemies of Allah, and many verses in this spirit were broadcast. However, more recent articles published on the Hamas website suggest that its view has undergone a transformation. Hamas has apparently shifted from extolling its “divine victory” on October 7 to admitting that it has been defeated in battle again and again. The great suffering Hamas has inflicted on the Gaza Strip has put it in the position where it must now explain to the Palestinian public why it started the war in the first place, why it did not expect a massive military response from Israel to its atrocities and attempt at genocide, and why the suffering of the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip is not in vain.
IDF Spokesperson
In this article I will present five alternatives for the future of Gaza. Israel’s long-term strategy to ensure its continued existence entails the accomplishment of these goals: destruction of Hamas's military capabilities, abolition of Hamas control in Gaza, and the preservation of good relations with the United States. Less core strategic considerations are the return of the abductees, the crisis on the northern front, relations within the region, and Israel’s legitimacy. The alternatives for Gaza’s future are: the Hamas option, which is the most problematic; the revitalized Palestinian Authority option; the military-civilian option, which seems the most balanced; the chaos option; and the sovereignty option, which is also very problematic. It is essential to conduct a far-reaching discussion on all these alternatives and to avoid attachment to any one of them.
The UN decision on May 10, 2024 to upgrade the status of the Palestinian state is not surprising. It is a direct continuation of previous UN decisions, most notably that of November 29, 2012, which granted the Palestinian Authority the status of non-member observer state. Since the 1970s, there has been an almost automatic majority for anti-Israel resolutions in the UN. This majority includes Muslim countries and countries that define themselves as part of the "Global South", such as African countries and some South American countries, all of which are known for their invariably critical approach towards Israel. The UN’s recognition of the Palestinian Authority grants the Palestinians an independent state without a negotiated peace process or clearly defined and agreed borders between it and Israel. This is precisely the situation the PLO has been striving for since 1974. The establishment of a Palestinian state without peace with Israel is a sure recipe for instability and perpetual war in the Middle East, and those negative consequences are being deliberately fomented by the UN.
Iran’s revenge missile attack on Israel on the night of April 13-14, 2024, the first-ever direct attack by Iran on Israel, was by no means a minor gesture intended to save face and cause minimal damage, as it was spun in some quarters after the event. This was a strike of unprecedented magnitude that was even more powerful than the Russian opening strike against Ukraine in 2022. The extraordinary success of Israel’s defense against the massive Iranian barrage was substantially due to the assistance of the Americans under the leadership of President Joe Biden. The operation demonstrated American diplomatic and military clout as well as the readiness of the US to use its military power to defend an ally, sending an important message not only to Iran but to China and Russia as well.
IDF Spokesperson
Executive Summary: Israel's wars, according to Israel's traditional defense strategy, are aimed at thwarting and removing military threats, not at politically shaping the region. Hence our familiar focus on the military dimension. But the goal of the war in Gaza is more ambitious: the destruction of the Hamas regime. Accordingly, its realization depends on additional dimensions. A slow reconstruction of parts of Gaza based on military achievements can regain the initiative, transfer the pressure back to Hamas, and serve as a lever for a hostage deal. This is also a one-time opportunity for Israel to physically shape the ruined Strip according to its interests. Once we finally get out of the strategic corner we've fallen into, we would be wise to return to the more modest Israeli approach to war. We will focus on the effective removal of threats and leave the business of political engineering to the powers.
IDF Spokesperson
Israel's main objective in the Iron Swords War is to topple the Hamas regime – an ambitious goal that seeks to change the political-strategic reality in Gaza. To achieve it, international cooperation is required to ensure legitimacy for the new regime as well as funding for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, establishment of its civilian administration, transfer of Gazan public servants to a new employer, de-radicalization, and internal security. The war must therefore be conducted by a coalition. Indeed, the war began with an unprecedented alignment of the United States, the West, and moderate Arab countries on Israel's side. But Israel’s refusal to conduct a dialogue with the international partners on the nature of the regime that will replace Hamas, foot-dragging on the humanitarian issue, extremist messaging, and poor management of the legal dimension have resulted in severe damage to Israel's legitimacy and ability to harness the international community’s help in achieving the war's objectives. The damage was done with no associated gains, as the Israeli government's conduct has steered it away from, rather than toward, achieving the goals of the war. Unless there is a profound change in the way the government conducts itself (and if it is not already too late), Israel's situation in the coming years will be worse than it was before the war.
The local elections in Turkey at the end of March 2024 had some surprising results. Economic factors were a decisive factor in the relatively low numbers for the ruling AK Party. Pensioners, a growing demographic sector in Turkey, were frequently mentioned during the AK Party’s election campaign but were neglected in practice, which was the main reason for the AK Party's failure. In both the near and distant term, it will now be impossible to ignore the rights of pensioners in Turkey.
IDF Spokesperson
What are the lessons for IDF force build-up following the Hamas attack on October 7 and the Iron Swords War? A recent article by Prof. Azar Gat concludes that "there is no need to increase the scope of the forces and the existing force build-up should be continued, the main [element] of which is investments in technologies that are the key to the advantage of the IDF on the battlefield and for the current achievements." We do not agree with this conclusion and believe it to have negative strategic consequences. The continuing inability of the IDF to realize the goals of the current war is mainly the result of a lack of ready and available maneuvering units, a lack that military technology cannot compensate for no matter how good it is. If the IDF is to be able to fulfill its responsibilities, it needs more well-trained maneuver divisions to resurrect the territorial defense organization as well as maintain technological superiority.
© IDF Spokesperson
In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities – not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization, certainty, preoccupation with cyber, targeting, professionalism, understanding, and risk management.

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