Russia

The massive protests staged in Russia by supporters of opposition leader Alexei Navalny pose a serious threat to the country’s political elite. The Kremlin has a problem on its hands no matter what it does. Whether Navalny is kept in prison or released, his movement will be strengthened, and it has the potential to fuse to broader public dissent over Russia’s long-term economic performance and government ineffectiveness.
As the world awaits Joe Biden’s inauguration as president of the US, Washington’s relations with China are under primary scrutiny. However, ties with Russia are no less important, as the two states have numerous differences across Eurasia. Washington will have to apply a careful balance of pressure on Russia to keep it from growing closer to China, and Biden possesses the statesmanship and experience to accomplish this. US-Russia relations under Biden should be strikingly different from what they were during the Trump administration.
After four years of supporting Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to curry favor with Joe Biden days before the US presidential election. He did this despite Biden’s sharp anti-Russian rhetoric and amidst the Democrats’ four-year-long accusation that Trump had colluded with Russia (with Biden himself calling Trump “Putin’s puppy”). Putin will never allow personal preference of one leader over another to override Russian national interests, and it is those interests that will dictate his diplomatic approach to President Biden.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become an important component of Turkish foreign policy. Over the years, Ankara’s support for Baku has grown exponentially. Diplomacy was an element of this support, but more significant was the dispatch of sophisticated weaponry. Greater support for Azerbaijan coincided with Turkey’s more active foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and is now strikingly different from Ankara-Baku relations of the 1990s and even the early 2010s. The reason for Ankara’s assertiveness could be access to energy and trade routes.
No major power has attempted in earnest to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, and some have actively participated in keeping the situation ablaze. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been actively preparing for hostilities, but Armenia finds itself at a political and military disadvantage.
Historians covering the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 tend to focus on the strategic and regional ramifications deriving from the unexpected victory of the Japanese. Less attention is paid to the motives behind Japan’s decision to launch a surprise attack on Russia. An article written in 1935 by Israeli historian Prof. Joseph Klausner may solve this mystery. Based upon the testimony of a Japanese intelligence agent, the article points to the 1903 Kishinev pogrom as the decisive factor that led the Japanese to initiate war with Russia. 
There are signs that the current escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, far from being incidental to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is driven by Russia’s and Iran’s economic warfare against a competing state and the need to return Europe to dependency on their oil and gas in light of US sanctions. Armenia benefits from the bellicose activity thanks to a sophisticated information warfare campaign in a heated US election year that has been unmatched thus far by Azerbaijan. But Baku can still turn its underdog position around by pursuing an assertive and affirmative policy against aggressors on military, political, media, and legal fronts.

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