Homepage

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has revived Turkey’s plans to construct oil and gas pipelines through the country, turning it into a regional “energy corridor” for neighboring states. Some of these plans would offer the Arab Gulf States a more convenient land route for exporting energy to Europe through Turkey, posing a challenge to Israel’s similar aspirations. Israel has other opportunities to export its natural gas to new markets via pipeline, but they pose the risk of undermining Israel’s relationship with Greece and Cyprus. Israel should follow the "pipeline game" in Syria closely to ensure that new economic opportunities in the region don't pass it by.
In the complex and often unpredictable realm of global politics, few political developments carry as much potential for transformative impact as the prospect of a second Trump presidency. This collection of expert analyses delves into the multifaceted implications of such a scenario, offering a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of how a Trump return to the White House could reshape global strategic landscapes. With a special focus on the Middle East and Israel, the publication provides an in-depth examination of how potential shifts in US foreign policy could reconfigure regional dynamics and strategic relationships.
The acceptance by Israel of a ceasefire arrangement on the war front with Hezbollah in Lebanon constitutes a strategic “bet”. Israel will need to take a multifaceted approach to the arrangement that is based on enhancing defensive capabilities while, at the offensive level, committing to proactively preventing Hezbollah's re-entrenchment in southern Lebanon. This strategy, while compelling, is not without its paradoxes, particularly regarding the potential for escalation that could follow Israeli enforcement of the arrangement.
In a recent column in Haaretz, Prof. Yagil Levy argues, based on a "fundamental comparison", that the IDF in its war in Gaza is not the moral army it claims to be. Levy's claim is absurd. According to his method, which is based on the ratio of our forces' casualties to those in the enemy population, sloppy fighting with many IDF casualties would constitute a morally virtuous approach to war. The following response addresses in detail the claims made by Levy, offers a different standard of reference, and argues that the numbers on which Levy relies actually indicate an especially high level of distinction between the enemy and those not involved in the war in Gaza.
Israel’s move in the north signals a clear strategy - the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy's ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror – however successful they may be – are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israel’s approach to defeating Hezbollah.
Yahya Sinwar was the individual most closely associated with Hamas and with the war initiated by that organization on October 7, 2023. On that date, Hamas terrorists swarmed across the Israeli border, killed approximately 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and kidnapped approximately 250 more to the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s elimination on October 17, 2024, is an image of Israeli victory. A year after the outbreak of the war and after the recent elimination of Sinwar, Hamas is now at a crossroads. Will its new leadership accept an arrangement that returns the abductees, ends the war, and brings the group’s rule in the Gaza Strip to an end? Or will Hamas continue along Sinwar’s lines - a futile war against Israel that will lead to yet further suffering for the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza?

Accessibility Toolbar