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Reshaping the Global Landscape:
How Will Trump’s Return Redefine Global Dynamics?

In the complex and often unpredictable realm of global politics, few political developments carry as much potential for transformative impact as the prospect of a second Trump presidency. This collection of expert analyses delves into the multifaceted implications of such a scenario, offering a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of how a Trump return to the White House could reshape global strategic landscapes. With a special focus on the Middle East and Israel, the publication provides an in-depth examination of how potential shifts in US foreign policy could reconfigure regional dynamics and strategic relationships.

Israel’s Strategic Gamble in Lebanon

The acceptance by Israel of a ceasefire arrangement on the war front with Hezbollah in Lebanon constitutes a strategic “bet”. Israel will need to take a multifaceted approach to the arrangement that is based on enhancing defensive capabilities while, at the offensive level, committing to proactively preventing Hezbollah's re-entrenchment in southern Lebanon. This strategy, while compelling, is not without its paradoxes, particularly regarding the potential for escalation that could follow Israeli enforcement of the arrangement.

Levy’s Anti-IDF Argument Shows a Loss of Moral Direction

In a recent column in Haaretz, Prof. Yagil Levy argues, based on a "fundamental comparison", that the IDF in its war in Gaza is not the moral army it claims to be. Levy's claim is absurd. According to his method, which is based on the ratio of our forces' casualties to those in the enemy population, sloppy fighting with many IDF casualties would constitute a morally virtuous approach to war. The following response addresses in detail the claims made by Levy, offers a different standard of reference, and argues that the numbers on which Levy relies actually indicate an especially high level of distinction between the enemy and those not involved in the war in Gaza.

The IDF’s Gamble in Lebanon

Israel’s move in the north signals a clear strategy - the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy's ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror – however successful they may be – are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israel’s approach to defeating Hezbollah.

The Future of Hamas and the War in Gaza After the Sinwar Era

Yahya Sinwar was the individual most closely associated with Hamas and with the war initiated by that organization on October 7, 2023. On that date, Hamas terrorists swarmed across the Israeli border, killed approximately 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and kidnapped approximately 250 more to the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s elimination on October 17, 2024, is an image of Israeli victory. A year after the outbreak of the war and after the recent elimination of Sinwar, Hamas is now at a crossroads. Will its new leadership accept an arrangement that returns the abductees, ends the war, and brings the group’s rule in the Gaza Strip to an end? Or will Hamas continue along Sinwar’s lines - a futile war against Israel that will lead to yet further suffering for the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza?

From Oslo to Be’eri: How the 30-Year Peace Delusion Led to the October 7 Hamas Massacres by Efraim Karsh

The following study was written by Prof. Efraim Karsh, former Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and Professor Emeritus of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King's College London. Prof. Karsh is the former Director of the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia, where he edited the journal Middle East Quarterly from 2010 through 2023. He is the founding editor of the journal Israel Affairs and founding general editor of the Routledge book series Israeli History, Politics and Society. He is the author of sixteen books and over 100 scholarly articles.  The failure to prevent Hamas’s slaughter of some 1,300 Israelis on 7 October 2023 – the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust – is a direct result of an emergency phone consultation three hours before the terror group’s invasion of Israel with the participation of the IDF’s and Shin Bet’s top leaders, who decided to do nothing despite acute warning signals and failed to alert the Gaza division commander and the political echelon to the imminent attack. Had they taken the minimal precautionary measures, the catastrophe would have been averted altogether. To fully understand the mindset underlying this monumental blunder requires tracing its evolution within the context of the 30-years-long Oslo peace delusion in general, and during the turbulent year preceding the 7 October massacres in particular. That is: the substitution of a grand strategic deception aimed at Israel’s destruction for a true peace process and the attendant emasculation of the IDF’s military capabilities and combative/offensive ethos, on the one hand, and the unravelling of Israel’s sociopolitical fabric that culminated in the 2023 mass civil disobedience that enticed Hamas into action, on the other. Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposed the Oslo process from the outset and managed to neutralise its most catastrophic potential calamity – the establishment of a Palestinian state committed to Israel’s destruction in the West Bank and Gaza – failed to extricate Israel from this disastrous course and was ironically forced to bear its full brunt on 7 October 2023.

Israel: The Making of a Global Cyber Power

In the aftermath of October 7, there is a clear need to reexamine Israel’s principles of defense. It is already clear that a considerable military build-up and additional investments will be required. However, we must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. More of the same – the restoration of a strategy based on deterrence, greater firepower, a wider order of forces, and more durable fortifications – may prove unsatisfactory and even distracting. This study seeks to contribute to the formulation of a sustainable strategy. We will do this not by citing principles that should be added to the concept of security but by addressing the type of discussion that is required. Along the way we will question some of the automatic responses to the crisis.

India and Japan Are Balancing the Indo-Pacific Region and the Global Arena

The current strengthening of relations between India and Japan demonstrates a change in both countries’ foreign and security policy. Each side sees the other as an important element in balancing China and creating an alliance that could replace the US, should it ultimately decide to retreat from Asia. New Delhi and Tokyo have expanded cooperation in security and economic sectors, participated in joint military exercises, and engaged actively in the Quad forum, which is aimed at countering the Chinese threat and maintaining regional stability. Japan's defense policy changes and the growing US presence in the Indo-Pacific support this partnership, reinforcing their joint commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

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