Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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On May 9, Israel initiated a direct attack on the senior commanders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza while ignoring Hamas, its third such attack since November 2019. The operation was Israel’s response to an escalation of rocket and mortar fire by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an escalation that was itself a response to the death of a senior member of the group’s West Bank branch while on hunger strike in an Israeli prison.  Hamas, the sovereign ruler of Gaza, preferred, as in the two previous bouts between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to sit the fight out, choosing instead to maintain the ceasefire to which it agreed after Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021.
Forty-four years ago, in March 1979, Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty that many thought impossible. The negotiations were often tense, with numerous crises and complex compromises, but eventually, terms were settled, and the agreement has held firm ever since. The warfare ended; embassies, economic ties and transportation links were established; and over time, close strategic coordination in promoting stability in the region was established. In many respects, this was the most significant example of a successful peace process since the end of World War II, and it can serve as an example for Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the Islamic Republic of Iran found a new avenue through which to carry on its anti-Western and anti-Israeli missions. Tehran has pledged to support its Russian ally in Ukraine and is sending weapons and other supplies to the Russian war effort. It is similarly assisting Armenia, its ally in the Caucasus, in its ongoing conflict with Israel- and-Turkey-backed Azerbaijan.
Recent papers by experts and think tanks claim that multiple negative trends occurring simultaneously in Israel’s strategic environment have coalesced into a major threat. There is in fact no clear connection between the trends they identify. The “strategic warning” is unnecessary and could even cause harm, as it distracts from continued critical engagement with the internal issues that are dividing Israeli society, makes it difficult to discuss the main strategic issues facing Israel, and causes an immediate focus on preparedness rather than orderly force build-up.
The future of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political career will be decided on May 14, when his People’s Alliance will compete with the Nation’s Alliance in a presidential and parliamentary election round. Opposition parties hope to give a democratic and pro-Western boost to Turkey. The country is polarized and thus might be ready to make major changes, especially after 20 years of a single administration. Still, Mediterranean geopolitics are unlikely to be significantly affected regardless of the outcome. This is also true of Israeli-Turkish relations.
Turkey is approaching the centenary of its founding, a significant date not only for its past but also for its future. With the May 14 election approaching, polls and commentators are beginning to discuss the post-Erdoğan era. The upcoming elections are critical and may bring about a historic change in Turkish politics. As things currently stand, no electoral outcome is likely to result in a return to the “golden age” of relations between Israel and Turkey.
Public discourse in South Korea and Japan has begun to include discussion of the development of nuclear capabilities. This policy change in the regional nuclear discourse, together with attempts by North Korea and Russia to legitimize the use of tactical nuclear weapons, should raise concerns not just in Asia but in the Middle East as well.
The recent reconciliation agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia dismayed many Israeli policymakers, analysts, and journalists. The agreement suggests that Saudi Arabia is steering away from its course of rapprochement with Israel and cuddling up to the ayatollahs, thereby eroding Israel’s geostrategic position in the Middle East. But the widespread assessment of this development as entirely bad for Israel is short-sighted.
The main challenges currently facing the IDF are preparations to strike Iran’s nuclear sites and confrontation of pro–Iranian non-state actors (NSAs), mainly Hezbollah and Hamas. The IDF also has to deal with other important security matters, including ongoing unrest in the West Bank and the military campaign against Iran and Hezbollah in Syria.

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