How Did Israel Win the Iron Swords War?

Israel began the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, on a “Yom Kippur War” dynamic: the devastating assault on Israel conducted that morning by Hamas was a strategic and operational surprise that collapsed the defense of the Gaza envelope and with it, the foundations of Israel's national security. The war ended on January 17, 2025, on a “Six-Day War” dynamic: a fundamental positive change had occurred on all of Israel's main combat fronts. How did this happen? Israel’s success was the result of intelligent decision-making, military and national strength, and luck. Israel must further improve its decision-making process and enhance its military and national strengths while reducing its reliance on luck and the failures of its opponents, who also learned lessons from this war.

Israel and Greece in 2025

Israeli-Greek relations were tested during the Israel-Hamas war. While Greece preferred to take a balanced stance at the UN level, it was eager to cement its strategic partnership with the Jewish State in difficult times. Arms deals and energy agreements were on the agenda and bilateral trade volume increased. The Middle East ceasefires can perhaps pave the way for even stronger Greek-Israeli ties. The visit of Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis to Jerusalem in February 2025 confirms the common objective. Israeli-Greek consultations are expected to intensify this year, while the beginning of the second Trump presidency could push the US to play a more active role in the process.

Hezbollah’s Soul-Searching Reveals Its Defeat

Hezbollah's leadership cannot ignore growing voices supporting a new strategy for the movement that emphasizes its Lebanese identity. If adopted, this approach could mean a reduction of the organization's traditional dependence on Iran and a more practical and substantive integration into domestic Lebanese politics. Right now, the likelihood that Hezbollah will take the initiative to renew fighting with Israel seems slim.

Israel and the Emerging Trends in Syria

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria reveals the Middle East as a dynamic ecosystem in which small changes can lead to big surprises. The IDF responded quickly to the collapse with three goals: strengthening defenses in the Golan Heights, destroying Syrian weapons, and projecting power in the regional space. The regional reality is shaped by historical memory and religious and national dreams, and does not operate according to a stable linear model. The countries in the region strive for active involvement beyond their borders, and Israel has no choice but to adopt a more flexible strategic approach of integration into the space rather than settling for internal convergence. The events in Syria proved once again that the “villa-in-the-jungle” approach, meaning isolation from the external environment, does not serve Israeli goals.

”Semi-Self Governance” of Countries or Regions That Lack Proper Governance

Israel, the US, and other international and regional actors are faced with a dilemma. They are unwilling to invest too many resources in countries/regions with poor governance, but need to prevent negative developments like famine and terrorism from arising. One possible approach to this problem is “Semi-Self Governance” (SSG), which allows local forces to take accountability and improve the lives of their civilian populations while allowing for external intervention when problems develop. This principle could align with President Trump’s strategic vision.

Greenland: The Strategic Center of the High North

Growing competition in the Arctic Circle is putting Greenland's strategic position on the public agenda. The Arctic island, which is under Danish sovereignty, is vital to American interests given the military presence of Russia and China and the nearby shipping lanes. These interests are leading to secret understandings between Denmark and the US.

Israel’s Dilemma: Should It Strike Iran’s Nuclear Program Before January 20?

Israel faces a critical strategic decision regarding Iran's nuclear program. The Islamic Republic is accelerating its enrichment capabilities and is systematically approaching the threshold of nuclear breakout. At issue is whether to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure immediately, leveraging Iran's degraded air defenses and regional setbacks during the “lame duck” period of the current Biden administration, or wait for a potential alignment with the incoming Trump administration, which could bring enhanced diplomatic and military support. Both options carry significant potential risks and benefits.

Is the Moment at Hand to Rid Syria of Its Chemical Weapons?

The collapse of the Assad regime has returned the issue of Syrian chemical weapons to the fore. The international community now sees a favorable opportunity to root them out, provided that effective cooperation with the new Syrian regime is established.

Israel’s Strategic Gamble in Lebanon

The acceptance by Israel of a ceasefire arrangement on the war front with Hezbollah in Lebanon constitutes a strategic “bet”. Israel will need to take a multifaceted approach to the arrangement that is based on enhancing defensive capabilities while, at the offensive level, committing to proactively preventing Hezbollah's re-entrenchment in southern Lebanon. This strategy, while compelling, is not without its paradoxes, particularly regarding the potential for escalation that could follow Israeli enforcement of the arrangement.

Levy’s Anti-IDF Argument Shows a Loss of Moral Direction

In a recent column in Haaretz, Prof. Yagil Levy argues, based on a "fundamental comparison", that the IDF in its war in Gaza is not the moral army it claims to be. Levy's claim is absurd. According to his method, which is based on the ratio of our forces' casualties to those in the enemy population, sloppy fighting with many IDF casualties would constitute a morally virtuous approach to war. The following response addresses in detail the claims made by Levy, offers a different standard of reference, and argues that the numbers on which Levy relies actually indicate an especially high level of distinction between the enemy and those not involved in the war in Gaza.

Perspectives Papers