Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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The acceptance by Israel of a ceasefire arrangement on the war front with Hezbollah in Lebanon constitutes a strategic “bet”. Israel will need to take a multifaceted approach to the arrangement that is based on enhancing defensive capabilities while, at the offensive level, committing to proactively preventing Hezbollah's re-entrenchment in southern Lebanon. This strategy, while compelling, is not without its paradoxes, particularly regarding the potential for escalation that could follow Israeli enforcement of the arrangement.
In a recent column in Haaretz, Prof. Yagil Levy argues, based on a "fundamental comparison", that the IDF in its war in Gaza is not the moral army it claims to be. Levy's claim is absurd. According to his method, which is based on the ratio of our forces' casualties to those in the enemy population, sloppy fighting with many IDF casualties would constitute a morally virtuous approach to war. The following response addresses in detail the claims made by Levy, offers a different standard of reference, and argues that the numbers on which Levy relies actually indicate an especially high level of distinction between the enemy and those not involved in the war in Gaza.
Israel’s move in the north signals a clear strategy - the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy's ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror – however successful they may be – are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israel’s approach to defeating Hezbollah.
Yahya Sinwar was the individual most closely associated with Hamas and with the war initiated by that organization on October 7, 2023. On that date, Hamas terrorists swarmed across the Israeli border, killed approximately 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and kidnapped approximately 250 more to the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s elimination on October 17, 2024, is an image of Israeli victory. A year after the outbreak of the war and after the recent elimination of Sinwar, Hamas is now at a crossroads. Will its new leadership accept an arrangement that returns the abductees, ends the war, and brings the group’s rule in the Gaza Strip to an end? Or will Hamas continue along Sinwar’s lines - a futile war against Israel that will lead to yet further suffering for the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza?
The current strengthening of relations between India and Japan demonstrates a change in both countries’ foreign and security policy. Each side sees the other as an important element in balancing China and creating an alliance that could replace the US, should it ultimately decide to retreat from Asia. New Delhi and Tokyo have expanded cooperation in security and economic sectors, participated in joint military exercises, and engaged actively in the Quad forum, which is aimed at countering the Chinese threat and maintaining regional stability. Japan's defense policy changes and the growing US presence in the Indo-Pacific support this partnership, reinforcing their joint commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
The claim that Israel’s war in Gaza is driven by a desire to control Gaza's oil and gas resources has spread widely on social media and news platforms over the past year. However, Gaza has no known oil reserves and only one small, undeveloped offshore gas field, which Israel has never claimed. Surprisingly, this disinformation traces back to an official 2019 report by a UN agency (UNCTAD) that contained numerous false statements and unsubstantiated figures about non-existent energy reserves that were provided to it by known conspiracy theorists. Despite multiple analyses debunking every part of the report, the UN has not retracted it. This article examines the sources of the Gaza oil myth and points to deliberate attempts by the UNCTAD to fuel the false narrative of Israel seizing non-existent Palestinian oil.
The US presidential election in November 2024 will have a major impact on Asia. It will influence the US military presence as well as the balance of power in the region, and will affect the economies of the Asian countries. Joe Biden’s decision to leave the race and the elevation of Kamala Harris as the Democratic party candidate have forced Tokyo and Seoul to recalculate their policies towards Washington and the region.
IDF Spokesperson
Many commentators claim that Israel lacks a clear plan for “the day after” the end of the Iron Swords War. They argue that because of this supposed lack, Israel will not be able to hold onto its military achievements during the war, which will remain merely tactical. But Israel is not playing a short-term game. Beyond its declared war goals, Israel is aiming to create a new security reality in the region by weakening Iran and its proxies. This broader goal stems from the understanding that to Israel, this war is existential, and the removal of significant threats from Israel’s borders is non-negotiable. Israel understands that it cannot impose plans or political proposals on its opponents, be they Palestinian or Lebanese – but by demonstrating its clear military superiority over them, Israel will improve its position in future negotiations. Finally, there is potential for new regional arrangements, including normalization with more Arab countries, if Israel succeeds in significantly weakening the Iranian threat. If Israel can show potential allies major military achievements against a common enemy, it can suggest a political plan that will improve its position in the region – but not before then. For Israel there is no end game, only a long game.
Serious errors, vague corrections and omissions of information have appeared in the pages of The New York Times throughout the Israel-Hamas war. The Times is considered a “newspaper of record” and a reliable source of information, and is read by leaders and elites around the world. The paper has nevertheless committed a series of repeated errors about the war, invariably at Israel’s expense, despite editorial promises to apply extra scrutiny. The errors and omissions created false context and lacked transparency. This report focuses on the Al-Ahli Hospital explosion, reports of civilian casualties, the Times’s continued employment of questionable journalists, and testimonials from inside the newsroom.

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