The Politics of Flooding and Stability in North Korea

In July 2024, torrential rain poured down on North Korea. Thousands of homes were flooded, and more than 40,000 people in North Pyongang Province and other nearby provinces had to be evacuated. This was not the first natural disaster North Korea has experienced during the tenure of Kim Jong-un. Under his father's rule, drought, heavy rains, and a dysfunctional government that was unwilling to allow foreign non-governmental organizations to directly assist North Korean citizens led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands. Kim Jung-un's decision on how to cope with this summer’s natural disaster gives us indications of how he governs the country.

Governing the Sacred: A New Toolbox for Resolving Conflicts over Contested Sacred Sites

The Temple Mount, the Western Wall, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher - these are places of utmost importance to multiple religious groups, and they often give rise to bitter disputes and even acts of violence. The question of how to effectively govern and manage such sites is of paramount practical significance. Until recently, no systematic models of governance for contested sacred sites have been proposed. This article describes a typology of five governance models in terms of their attributes, advantages, and disadvantages so that decision-makers, scholars, religious figures, and other stakeholders can apply them as needed to different sacred sites.

Israel Must Defend Itself on Its Own – While Cooperating with Allies

"Defending itself with its own forces" is a key principle in Israel's national security concept. There is no contradiction between this basic principle and Israel’s comprehensive cooperation with the US.

Old Allies, Close Friends: The Strategic Importance of Bulgaria for Israel

Bulgaria is one of Israel’s most reliable partners in the world, particularly in southeastern Europe. The two countries enjoy excellent relations and cooperate in the fields of politics, security, economy, trade and tourism, as well as in the fight against antisemitism. Bulgaria exerts influence in the Balkan region and helps mitigate the negative impact on Israel deriving from Israel’s complicated relationship with Turkey. Bulgaria serves as a gateway through which to introduce Israeli policies, business initiatives, and energy projects to the Balkan region and Europe as a whole.

The North Korean Coronation Process: Who Will Become Regent After Kim Jong-un?

Kim Jong-un's health problems and their implications for the continuity of the Kim family’s dynastic regime are critical issues for the North Korean dictatorship, which must prepare the next generation to rule the state. The question is, who will become the next leader if Kim Jong-un dies – his daughter or his sister?

The Long War Phenomenon:
Is a New Security Concept Required After October 7?

David Ben-Gurion's classic security concept made these assumptions: first, that Israel would never be able to force an absolute end to the conflict on its enemies; and second, that Israel cannot maintain a large army for long, so its security requires a reserve army and sufficient warning before war breaks out. This has resulted in a restless reality of short, intense rounds of war. The October 7 disaster prompted a sense that this concept had failed, and that it is time for Israel to adopt a new concept in which the enemy is completely defeated and no longer poses a threat. To a certain extent, the Iron Swords War is an attempt to eliminate the Hamas threat from Gaza once and for all, and possibly after that, the elimination of the Hezbollah threat as well. But can Israel eliminate Hamas (and Hezbollah)? Would attempting to do so be worth the practical price of the long war it would require? Would Israel’s society, economy, and state survive the attempt? Does the failure of Israel’s security concept on October 7 mean a new concept is required, or did the concept fail to be implemented properly on that Sabbath (and even more so since then)? In other words: Should the existing security concept be replaced or strengthened?

To Defend Israel, Rearrange the Sky

The current war, and Hezbollah's drone strikes, have made clear that Israeli air superiority does not apply to the "low sky" layer. The fact that the enemy is targeting the air defense itself stands out. The security establishment is working on finding solutions to the challenge, but development and procurement alone will not be enough. The basic premise of our air defense system has been undermined. The system must be reorganized on the basis of two understandings: first, that destroying Israeli air defense will be the enemy's first goal; and second, that the challenge of protecting the forces at the front requires different organizational and command and control means than the challenge of protecting the home front. As did the anti-aircraft units of the past, our tactical air defense at the front requires reorganization.

The Secret War Behind the Exchanges of Fire in the North

The current war of attrition in Israel’s north is not just a series of reaction equations. It is a race to learn about the enemy and prepare for a battle in which both sides will try to overwhelm the opposing military force. The exchanges of fire are providing Hezbollah with an opportunity to study the Israeli air defense system in detail. This is a serious risk that deserves to be given its due weight.

Madness, Sanity and Nuclear War in the Middle East

In world politics, it would seem obvious that sanity is better than madness. Upon reflection, however, the risks of nuclear war could be as high or higher among “sane” adversaries. For Israel, a country smaller than America’s Lake Michigan, a failure to understand this counterintuitive truth could hasten the onset of unprecedented hostilities with Iran. Most ominously, it could mean Israel’s eventually suffering an Iranian nuclear attack.

It’s Not a Border. It’s a Front.

Israel’s flawed strategy of deterring and appeasing its adversaries has had a negative impact on military thinking. In recent decades, the border fence has turned from a tactical measure into a mental barrier. The fence was seen to distinguish between “their territory” and “our territory,” or between a dangerous space and an apparently safe one. The lesson of the failure of October 7 is not to erect stronger obstacles. We have built border barriers in the north and south many times over the decades, and they always fail. A border is a political concept, not a military one. The relevant military concept is a “front.” A front, on both sides of the border, is a challenging combat space that requires tactical independence for the forces, especially in the areas of combat gathering, fire support and air defense.

Perspectives Papers