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President Donald Trump's controversial initiative to relocate the Palestinian population from the Gaza Strip, primarily to Egypt and Jordan, is causing a stir in the Arab world. While the strong public resistance to the idea expressed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Jordanian King Abdullah seems to negate the possibility that the president's initiative can be implemented, President Trump insists that his plan is achievable and that Egypt and Jordan will eventually cooperate. His resettlement idea, viewed in today’s political environment as anathema, has a series of historical precedents.
Israel’s original defense strategy strove to maximize wartime operational decisiveness as compensation for inferior resilience. In recent decades, anti-terror tactics have taken over our strategic thinking, pushing this principle aside. The current war is a crossroads. The October 7 attack can be seen as a localized failure, and the strategy of focusing on Hezbollah and Hamas can be continued. This would mean establishing buffer zones, which would lead to protracted guerrilla warfare and further weaken Israel. But there is another way to perceive the Iron Swords War: as the first campaign in a historic war against the Shiite axis. According to this view, this war is a defensive phase. As such, it has served its purpose. Its achievements are to be exploited for a major regrouping and the building of a renewed operational-level decisive capability to prepare us for the next phase of the broader war.
Israel began the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, on a “Yom Kippur War” dynamic: the devastating assault on Israel conducted that morning by Hamas was a strategic and operational surprise that collapsed the defense of the Gaza envelope and with it, the foundations of Israel's national security. The war ended on January 17, 2025, on a “Six-Day War” dynamic: a fundamental positive change had occurred on all of Israel's main combat fronts. How did this happen? Israel’s success was the result of intelligent decision-making, military and national strength, and luck. Israel must further improve its decision-making process and enhance its military and national strengths while reducing its reliance on luck and the failures of its opponents, who also learned lessons from this war.
Israeli-Greek relations were tested during the Israel-Hamas war. While Greece preferred to take a balanced stance at the UN level, it was eager to cement its strategic partnership with the Jewish State in difficult times. Arms deals and energy agreements were on the agenda and bilateral trade volume increased. The Middle East ceasefires can perhaps pave the way for even stronger Greek-Israeli ties. The visit of Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis to Jerusalem in February 2025 confirms the common objective. Israeli-Greek consultations are expected to intensify this year, while the beginning of the second Trump presidency could push the US to play a more active role in the process.
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria reveals the Middle East as a dynamic ecosystem in which small changes can lead to big surprises. The IDF responded quickly to the collapse with three goals: strengthening defenses in the Golan Heights, destroying Syrian weapons, and projecting power in the regional space. The regional reality is shaped by historical memory and religious and national dreams, and does not operate according to a stable linear model. The countries in the region strive for active involvement beyond their borders, and Israel has no choice but to adopt a more flexible strategic approach of integration into the space rather than settling for internal convergence. The events in Syria proved once again that the “villa-in-the-jungle” approach, meaning isolation from the external environment, does not serve Israeli goals.
Israel, the US, and other international and regional actors are faced with a dilemma. They are unwilling to invest too many resources in countries/regions with poor governance, but need to prevent negative developments like famine and terrorism from arising. One possible approach to this problem is “Semi-Self Governance” (SSG), which allows local forces to take accountability and improve the lives of their civilian populations while allowing for external intervention when problems develop. This principle could align with President Trump’s strategic vision.
Growing competition in the Arctic Circle is putting Greenland's strategic position on the public agenda. The Arctic island, which is under Danish sovereignty, is vital to American interests given the military presence of Russia and China and the nearby shipping lanes. These interests are leading to secret understandings between Denmark and the US.
Israel faces a critical strategic decision regarding Iran's nuclear program. The Islamic Republic is accelerating its enrichment capabilities and is systematically approaching the threshold of nuclear breakout. At issue is whether to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure immediately, leveraging Iran's degraded air defenses and regional setbacks during the “lame duck” period of the current Biden administration, or wait for a potential alignment with the incoming Trump administration, which could bring enhanced diplomatic and military support. Both options carry significant potential risks and benefits.

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