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The Israel National Cyber ​​Directorate (INCD) recently published an update of the country’s cyber security strategy. While the new strategy develops and updates the principles of its 2017 predecessor, it differs in its fundamental concept. The new version derives from broad national objectives in the cyber domain and focuses on protecting the means of securing core national processes and infrastructure. It addresses issues such as how to define the whole of national cyber security and how to deal with the technological supply network. The document is also influenced by the Iron Swords War in several ways. The strengths of the INCD should be built to the point that it can position itself as a leading part of the governmental and national cooperation network that will be required for implementation.
Wednesday I June 25th 8:00 - 9:20 PM I Israel time Prof. Eitan Shamir: Introduction Mr. Ran Segev: The background to the decision to attack Prof. Jonathan Rynhold: US CDR. David Levy: US capabilities in the region Dr. Eilai Rettig: Energy in the war Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos: India- Iran-Pakistan Col. (Res.) Shay Shabtai: The day after
Since October 2023, Israel’s primary strategic vector has been a campaign against its enemies in the region. This campaign is nearing its end. In the coming months, the open security issues of Gaza and Iran will be decided. The next strategic vector should be a reorientation of the national focus from a security-level “strike force” to a national-level “prime force”, as David Ben-Gurion did after the War of Independence. Israel should turn its attention to five “national projects”: a public transportation network, a computing network, advanced computing infrastructure, a health and welfare response to population growth, and a longstanding relevant and strong security force.
The Israeli intelligence system failed to understand the significance of the gender-based violence committed by Hamas on Israeli citizens during the October 7 attack. Raw information was not converted into meaningful insights that could have aided in strategic and operational decision-making. The failure stemmed in part from a lack of information, but also from an inability to analyze the information that was available, identify patterns, and prevent errors arising from cognitive bias and methodological obstacles. Hamas used gender-based violence as a deliberate strategy intended to cause severe harm to Israeli civilians, undermine Israelis’ sense of social security, and sow terror within Israeli society. Israeli intelligence failed to identify Hamas’s intentions prior to the attack and subsequently failed to deal effectively with the denials of Hamas and its supporters in the international system.
In May 2025, following a deadly terrorist attack on Pahalgam in Kashmir, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, conducted strikes deep within Pakistani territory, and declared that any future terrorist attack would henceforth be considered an act of war. These measures reflect a doctrinal shift from a policy of deterrence to one of “compellence”, or coercion. India has also unveiled unprecedented upgrades to its military capabilities that are part of a comprehensive organizational reform. India is positioning itself as a global military and technological power that is operating under a sovereign and independent strategy. This shift in India’s doctrinal approach reflects a continuation of its response to Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. According to Indian nationalists, Israel’s response to Hamas’s massive assault served as inspiration for an uncompromising policy towards Islamic terrorism.

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