Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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Hezbollah's leadership cannot ignore growing voices supporting a new strategy for the movement that emphasizes its Lebanese identity. If adopted, this approach could mean a reduction of the organization's traditional dependence on Iran and a more practical and substantive integration into domestic Lebanese politics. Right now, the likelihood that Hezbollah will take the initiative to renew fighting with Israel seems slim.
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria reveals the Middle East as a dynamic ecosystem in which small changes can lead to big surprises. The IDF responded quickly to the collapse with three goals: strengthening defenses in the Golan Heights, destroying Syrian weapons, and projecting power in the regional space. The regional reality is shaped by historical memory and religious and national dreams, and does not operate according to a stable linear model. The countries in the region strive for active involvement beyond their borders, and Israel has no choice but to adopt a more flexible strategic approach of integration into the space rather than settling for internal convergence. The events in Syria proved once again that the “villa-in-the-jungle” approach, meaning isolation from the external environment, does not serve Israeli goals.
Israel, the US, and other international and regional actors are faced with a dilemma. They are unwilling to invest too many resources in countries/regions with poor governance, but need to prevent negative developments like famine and terrorism from arising. One possible approach to this problem is “Semi-Self Governance” (SSG), which allows local forces to take accountability and improve the lives of their civilian populations while allowing for external intervention when problems develop. This principle could align with President Trump’s strategic vision.
Growing competition in the Arctic Circle is putting Greenland's strategic position on the public agenda. The Arctic island, which is under Danish sovereignty, is vital to American interests given the military presence of Russia and China and the nearby shipping lanes. These interests are leading to secret understandings between Denmark and the US.
Israel faces a critical strategic decision regarding Iran's nuclear program. The Islamic Republic is accelerating its enrichment capabilities and is systematically approaching the threshold of nuclear breakout. At issue is whether to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure immediately, leveraging Iran's degraded air defenses and regional setbacks during the “lame duck” period of the current Biden administration, or wait for a potential alignment with the incoming Trump administration, which could bring enhanced diplomatic and military support. Both options carry significant potential risks and benefits.
The acceptance by Israel of a ceasefire arrangement on the war front with Hezbollah in Lebanon constitutes a strategic “bet”. Israel will need to take a multifaceted approach to the arrangement that is based on enhancing defensive capabilities while, at the offensive level, committing to proactively preventing Hezbollah's re-entrenchment in southern Lebanon. This strategy, while compelling, is not without its paradoxes, particularly regarding the potential for escalation that could follow Israeli enforcement of the arrangement.
In a recent column in Haaretz, Prof. Yagil Levy argues, based on a "fundamental comparison", that the IDF in its war in Gaza is not the moral army it claims to be. Levy's claim is absurd. According to his method, which is based on the ratio of our forces' casualties to those in the enemy population, sloppy fighting with many IDF casualties would constitute a morally virtuous approach to war. The following response addresses in detail the claims made by Levy, offers a different standard of reference, and argues that the numbers on which Levy relies actually indicate an especially high level of distinction between the enemy and those not involved in the war in Gaza.
Israel’s move in the north signals a clear strategy - the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy's ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror – however successful they may be – are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israel’s approach to defeating Hezbollah.
Yahya Sinwar was the individual most closely associated with Hamas and with the war initiated by that organization on October 7, 2023. On that date, Hamas terrorists swarmed across the Israeli border, killed approximately 1,200 people, most of them civilians, and kidnapped approximately 250 more to the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s elimination on October 17, 2024, is an image of Israeli victory. A year after the outbreak of the war and after the recent elimination of Sinwar, Hamas is now at a crossroads. Will its new leadership accept an arrangement that returns the abductees, ends the war, and brings the group’s rule in the Gaza Strip to an end? Or will Hamas continue along Sinwar’s lines - a futile war against Israel that will lead to yet further suffering for the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza?

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