PSCRP

IRGC logo (AI generated)
By inciting Azerbaijan, and consequently Turkey, the regime is initiating a riskier strategy. Yes, there is an economic component: a strike on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would further drive up oil prices, threaten Israel's energy security, and complicate the situation in Turkey. In addition, it creates a threat to the "Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity" project through the Zangezur Corridor. But this remains a secondary objective.
Azerbaija-Armenia road (AI Generated)
The February 2026 visit of U.S. Vice President JD Vance to Yerevan and Baku — the first time a sitting American vice president has set foot in either country — marks the consolidation of a deliberate strategic reorientation. Washington is moving to establish a durable presence in the South Caucasus at a moment when Russia’s credibility as a regional security patron has collapsed and Iran’s leverage over transit routes is under pressure. For Armenia, long considered Moscow’s most reliable client in the region, the moment is one of unusual and consequential opportunity.
Monitoring (AI generated)
January turned out to be a positive surprise: the speed of global transformations, the emergence of new configurations of interests, and new roles for seemingly traditional actors were fully on display across the post-Soviet space. And researchers felt it too, clearly revising their plans in favor of greater topicality and a demand for a strategic look from the standpoint of today and the near future.
A. Lukashenko (AI generated)
Lukashenka’s 2025/26 Middle East and North Africa tour illustrates enduring patterns of Belarusian foreign policy under his rule: the instrumentalization of diplomacy for international legitimacy, a highly personalized decision-making style centered on the ruling family, and proactive—often disruptive—efforts to secure relevance in global affairs. By situating the trip within Minsk’s broader diplomatic behavior, the analysis argues that Belarus should not be dismissed as a passive Russian proxy but understood as an autonomous spoiler capable of shaping regional dynamics. These features carry direct implications for Israel and Europe, particularly regarding Iran, sanctions evasion, and emerging security alignments.
The European Union’s 20th sanctions package marks an unprecedented escalation: for the first time, Brussels is targeting a port in a country that holds EU candidate status. Georgia’s Kulevi terminal, now implicated in facilitating Russian oil shipments, encapsulates a broader transformation underway in Tbilisi — one that is steadily converting a once-promising candidate for European integration into a facilitator of sanctions evasion for Moscow.
Forged in missile strikes, blackouts, and relentless air-raid sirens, Ukrainian society has adapted to life inside a war with no visible end — but not without deep psychological scars. Drawing on years of travel across Ukraine and engagement with refugees abroad, the report traces the rise of collective post-trauma, hardened attitudes toward Russia, and the growing sense of shared destiny with Israel as two democracies under siege. Beneath the surface resilience, however, lie widening internal divisions that may shape the country long after the guns fall silent.
Kazakhstan is rewriting almost its entire Constitution—and the stakes go far beyond parliamentary mechanics. Behind the talk of a unicameral legislature and a vice presidency lies a carefully staged power transition, a recalibration of foreign dependence, and a quiet effort by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to secure his post-presidential future without leaning on Moscow. This overhaul may redefine not only who governs Kazakhstan, but who ultimately guarantees that power.
Iranian flag
In recent analyses of the post-Soviet space, a persistent analytical gap remains between how Israeli–Azerbaijani relations are typically described and how they are perceived in Tehran. Most studies portray this partnership as pragmatic and transactional, largely confined to military-technical cooperation and limited in its implications for regional security beyond the South Caucasus. Yet such interpretations fail to explain the intensity and persistence of Iranian strategic anxiety toward Azerbaijan’s cooperation with Israel.

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