PSCRP

Tallinn (photo by P. Oskolkov)
On 26 March 2025, the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) voted on changing the country’s constitution in the part defining who is eligible to vote in local (municipal, in the case of cities) elections. On the surface, this measure does not look extraordinary, however, if we take into account the context of the Estonian sociodemographic situation, it becomes clear why the issue of municipal suffrage turned into one of the most discussed Estonian news topics in recent months.
Illustration
In the first part of the study, we showed that it was the position of Georgia's business elites that influenced the country's political course, shifting its vector from European integration to the Russian direction. This position is in no way connected with any phobias or personal preferences of Georgian-Russian magnates. The situation in Armenia is partly similar to Georgia, but has some peculiarities. We will talk about these peculiarities in detail and particulars in the second part of the publication.
Black hole (AI generated)
Since the Kremlin launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has begun acting like a geopolitical black hole in its own neighborhood. Facing Western sanctions and battlefield losses, Moscow is accelerating the draw on the two most dynamic economies in Central Asia — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — through energy deals, trade manipulation and political theatre. The closer these states drift, the harder (and costlier) it will be for them to break free.
Islamists in Russia (AI generated)
Russia’s attitude toward Islamists in general, and radical Islamist movements in particular, is neither consistent nor unambiguous. In its foreign policy, Russia actively supports Hezbollah and Hamas, which has been especially evident during the current Arab-Israeli war. The patron and protector of these and numerous other terrorist Islamist organizations, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is one of Russia's strategic partners. This partnership was formalized in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed on January 17, 2025.
Grozny (Shutterstock)
The regime cannot afford a “third Chechen war”, so after Kadyrov it will continue its policy of extremely harsh crackdowns and bribery of local elites. Since Kadyrov has no unconditional and universally recognized successor, it is possible that attempts will be made to build complex combinations based on a balance of interests of a number of key figures, with the federal center retaining the role of arbiter.
Georgia applied for EU membership alongside Moldova on March 3, 2022. In June of the same year, the European Commission recommended granting candidate status to both republics, but the decision on Tbilisi’s application was postponed. Georgia ultimately received candidate status in December 2023. Yet, on November 28, 2024, the Georgian authorities announced their decision to suspend EU accession negotiations from the national agenda until 2028. What happened?
Erzyan national flag
The Erzyan national movement deserves special consideration: the problems it is trying to solve are characteristic not only of the Republic of Mordovia. They are also relevant for other national autonomies located in the east of the European part of the Russian Federation, far from the state borders, where the peoples belonging to the Finno-Ugric linguistic group live: the Republic of Komi, the Republic of Udmurtia and the Republic of Mari El.
Belarus is the only post-Soviet country whose national language has been losing its positions over the decades that followed the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, it is the only post-Soviet state other than the Russian Federation where Russian has the status of the state language (in Kyrgyzstan, Russian has the status of “official” but not the state language).

Accessibility Toolbar