PSCRP
In the Russian media, the objective coverage of the efforts of the Israeli authorities and military to counter the aggression of Hamas is growing thin. At the same time, stories full of sympathy for the terrorists and condemnation of Israel are becoming increasingly common. Many Armenian media outlets, social media and NGOs are joining in.
The issue of political representation of the Russian (or rather, Russian-speaking) minority, who comprise ca. 24 percent of the population, has been a challenge for Estonia since the re-establishing of independence in 1991. Even though some sources tend to exaggerate the problem of non-citizenship in Estonia, only 20 percent of the local Russians have so-called “alien’s passports.” Moreover, even non-citizens are allowed to vote in the municipal elections.
One cannot fail to notice that the conflict between Israel and Palestinian Arabs occupies a distinct place in the ideological and political discourse accompanying post-Soviet armed conflicts, primarily the Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts. This can involve the use of allusions and symbols associated with the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, aimed at ideologically justifying one's position and demonizing the opponent. It also pertains to the attempts of direct participants in post-Soviet conflicts and/or external actors to leverage fluctuations in Israel's relations with the "Palestinian National Authority" (PNA) in Ramallah, which governs the Arab enclaves in Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley (or, the “West Bank of the Jordan River”, in international discourse) on one hand, and the enclave of Islamic fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip on the other.
In the summer of 2023, Gagauz Yeri, Autonomous Territorial Unit in the Republic of Moldova, got into the spotlight of political commentaries. In May, Evghenia Guțul, a representative of the “Șor” political party, won the regional election for the post of Başkan, the regional governor. However, this electoral outcome was met with disdain and skepticism by the central authorities in Chișinău. Moldovan president Maia Sandu defiantly refused to attend Guțul’s official inauguration, the Anti-Corruption Committee attempted to seize ballot papers from the local election office (to which the region’s residents responded with mass protests), and Guțul herself claimed to have been threatened by the state prosecutor. What are the reasons for this situation and what could be the consequences for the political life in Moldova?
The establishment of Azerbaijani control over the entire territory of Nagorno-Karabakh has given rise to a wave of anti-Semitism in Armenia. The following anti-Semitic elements can be identified in contemporary Armenian public discourse.
For a significant period, Russian policy in Central Asia has differed from its approach toward Ukrainian or Georgian issues. It was characterized by fewer elements of ideology and greater pragmatism. Pragmatic elements that "softened" Russian foreign policy in the Central Asian direction persisted until 2021, owing to various factors. Russian officials, to some extent, recognized the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian countries, leading to a more accommodating stance toward the region. Central Asia was perceived as having limited prospects for NATO and EU expansion, partly due to the presence of authoritarian regimes and its geographical distance from Europe. This made Moscow's influence appear less threatened compared to regions like Ukraine. Global strategic considerations compelled Putin to acquiesce both Chinese and Turkish influences in Central Asia. Putin's personal limited interest in Central Asian affairs and the influence of regional leaders on Russian decision-makers sometimes fostered an atmosphere of pluralism. Russia shared a common enemy in the form of radical Islam with both the West and secular regimes in Muslim countries.
Common trends in Russia's relations with Central Asian countries during the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The current Azerbaijani military operation in Karabakh was framed in Baku as anti-terrorist, since it came as a reaction to a series of subversive actions, including the killing 19 September of 6 Azerbaijanis by Armenian separatist paramilitary units. As far as Armenia is concerned, the further developments might depend on how the current government in Yerevan plays its cards and whether it will survive in case of the defeat (as it looks like happen now) of the Karabakh separatists. A most intriguing, among other questions, is: whether it will deepen Yerevan’s dependence from Moscow? Or could it be Armenia's path towards independence from Russia?
On August 23rd, a plane crashed, carrying Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch and the founder of the private military corporation "Wagner." Among the victims was Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian officer who played a pivotal role in the formation of this semi-public, semi-private army. His call sign, "Wagner," lent its name to this organization, which, over the course of nine years, transformed into a tool of Russian power politics. Regardless of who was responsible for the plane's destruction, this event aligns with an overarching trend: the diminishing influence of Z-propaganda radicals, who perceive the Russian government's actions as passive and advocate for a more assertive policy towards Ukraine. This call also encompasses the notion of mobilizing Russian society on a comprehensive scale.