How Russia Tries to Use the Central Asian States After the Invasion of Ukraine

For a significant period, Russian policy in Central Asia has differed from its approach toward Ukrainian or Georgian issues. It was characterized by fewer elements of ideology and greater pragmatism. Pragmatic elements that "softened" Russian foreign policy in the Central Asian direction persisted until 2021, owing to various factors. Russian officials, to some extent, recognized the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian countries, leading to a more accommodating stance toward the region. Central Asia was perceived as having limited prospects for NATO and EU expansion, partly due to the presence of authoritarian regimes and its geographical distance from Europe. This made Moscow's influence appear less threatened compared to regions like Ukraine. Global strategic considerations compelled Putin to acquiesce both Chinese and Turkish influences in Central Asia. Putin's personal limited interest in Central Asian affairs and the influence of regional leaders on Russian decision-makers sometimes fostered an atmosphere of pluralism. Russia shared a common enemy in the form of radical Islam with both the West and secular regimes in Muslim countries.

Attempt to Capitalize on Neutrality: How Central Asian States Shape their Policies on Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Common trends in Russia's relations with Central Asian countries during the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The Newest Round of the Karabakh Conflict: Who Fights for Armenian Independence?

The current Azerbaijani military operation in Karabakh was framed in Baku as anti-terrorist, since it came as a reaction to a series of subversive actions, including the killing 19 September of 6 Azerbaijanis by Armenian separatist paramilitary units. As far as Armenia is concerned, the further developments might depend on how the current government in Yerevan plays its cards and whether it will survive in case of the defeat (as it looks like happen now) of the Karabakh separatists. A most intriguing, among other questions, is: whether it will deepen Yerevan’s dependence from Moscow? Or could it be Armenia's path towards independence from Russia?

The Brief Rise and Fall of Yevgeny Prigozhin

On August 23rd, a plane crashed, carrying Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch and the founder of the private military corporation "Wagner." Among the victims was Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian officer who played a pivotal role in the formation of this semi-public, semi-private army. His call sign, "Wagner," lent its name to this organization, which, over the course of nine years, transformed into a tool of Russian power politics. Regardless of who was responsible for the plane's destruction, this event aligns with an overarching trend: the diminishing influence of Z-propaganda radicals, who perceive the Russian government's actions as passive and advocate for a more assertive policy towards Ukraine. This call also encompasses the notion of mobilizing Russian society on a comprehensive scale.

Five Short and Medium-Term Scenarios of Conflict Dynamics in Post-Soviet Countries

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked the completion of a series of changes that gradually reshaped the balance of power and diplomatic relations that had established in the post-Soviet space since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This event created a considerable strategic uncertainty.

Karabakh as a Signifier: Transformation of Political Process in Armenia in Light of Geopolitical Realignments

The military escalation that took place in Karabakh in November 2020, has fundamentally transformed the (geo)political configuration in the region. After the fall of 2020, the territory of unrecognized “Artsakh” – “Nagorno-Karabakh republic”, established in 1991 on the part of the territory of mostly populated by ethnic Armenians Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, shrank almost four times. Azerbaijan has regained internationally recognized control of its lands and its refugees, who were forced out by the Armenians started to return there. Authorities of Armenia, historically a patron of the unrecognized enclave, are now actively preparing for a peaceful solution. However, this solution will be now probably written not in Yerevan.

The Russian-Speaking Jewish Diaspora and the War in Ukraine

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted political discourse among the Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora around the world. Ukrainian Jewry is almost unanimous in its support of the country’s leadership. In Belarus, Jewish organizations have distanced themselves from the subject of the war while individual Jews try to maintain calm. In Russia, a minority of Jews actively opposes the regime’s war policy, another small minority openly supports it, but the largest number of Jews are “psychologically alienated” from the issue. In Israel, Russian and Ukrainian Jewish immigrants appear largely willing to put personal differences aside as they forge a new identity as Israelis.

New Chapters in Iran’s Proxy Strategy to Fight the West

Ariel Kogan
May 18, 2023
Paper No. 2197

With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the Islamic Republic of Iran found a new avenue through which to carry on its anti-Western and anti-Israeli missions. Tehran has pledged to support its Russian ally in Ukraine and is sending weapons and other supplies to the Russian war effort. It is similarly assisting Armenia, its ally in the Caucasus, in its ongoing conflict with Israel- and-Turkey-backed Azerbaijan.

Antisemitic Tropes in the Age of Post-Soviet War

The new round of Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and the war in Ukraine both exhibit noticeable anti-Jewish aspects. However, their manifestations are not identical.

PSCRP