1 The Israel–Iran War: Israel’s New Strategic Opening Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai and Prof. Eitan Shamir, Editors The Bar-Ilan University Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Research Digest:
2 Photo: Shutterstock
3 The Israel–Iran War: Israel’s New Strategic Opening Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 PART I: ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES VERSUS IRAN IN THE IRAN WAR 8 ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC CALCULUS Ran Segev 9 OPERATION RISING LION: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE Eran Ortal 14 THE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OF ISRAEL DURING OPERATION RISING LION Uzi Rubin 20 WHAT CAN ISRAEL EXPECT FROM THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ON IRAN? Jonthan Rynhold 26 FROM ISRAEL’S USCENTCOM INTEGRATION TO OPERATION MIDNIGHT HAMMER David Levi 30 PART II: OTHER PLAYERS’ REACTIONS TO THE WAR 34 HOWGLOBAL OILMARKETSMITIGATED THE THREAT TOTHE STRAITS OF HORMUZ Elai Rettig 35 MID-EAST MISSTEP: WHAT THE ISRAEL-IRAN WAR REVEALS ABOUT CHINA’S STRATEGIC LIMITS Yoram Evron 37 MOSCOW, TRUMP, AND THE ISRAEL-IRAN WAR Alexander Shpunt and Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin 41 CIRCLES OF CONFLICT AND DETERRENCE CONSIDERATIONS: DYNAMICS AMONG INDIA, PAKISTAN, IRAN AND ISRAEL IN AN ERA OF CONFLICTING STRATEGIES Prof. Lauren Dagan 44 PART III: THE REGIONAL ‘DAY AFTER’ 50 A 1967 MOMENT: THE PATH FORWARD AFTER THE IRAN WAR Shay Shabtai 51 RECENT BESA CENTER PUBLICATIONS 55
4 The June 2025 open war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran marked a watershed moment in the history of the Middle East and in the evolution of Israeli warfare. While Israel had previously conducted long-range, high-risk operations such as the 1976 Entebbe raid, the 1985 strike in Tunis and operations against the Houthis in Yemen in the Iron Swords war, the Iran war was the first time in its history that Israel waged a sustained, multi-domain campaign against a geographically distant regional power with no shared border. For 12 days, Israel brought to bear the full weight of its long-range strike capabilities, missile defenses, intelligence networks, cyber arsenal and spectrum warfare, demonstrating a level of operational reach, integration and coordination unprecedented in its military history. The war was also the first true test of the Israeli home front under a new strategic paradigm. Iran’s retaliatory strikes, carried out through its missile arsenal and regional proxies, targeted Israeli cities and critical infrastructure. In response, Israel’s active defense systems, including multiple layers of missile and UAV interception, were activated on a national scale. Alongside these, passive protection systems, civilian shelters, rescue and recovery units, and the population’s overall behavior under fire became a central component of the war effort. The resilience and adaptability of the Israeli home front, often overlooked in traditional analyses, proved essential in enabling Israel to sustain the war effort without major societal disruption. The war also marked the first time in history that the United States not only provided material and diplomatic support to Israel but also actively participated in the campaign, albeit in a limited capacity. Executive Summary Photo: Shutterstock Prof. Eitan Shamir Head of the BESA Center and faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His most recent book, The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF (Harvard University Press, 2023), co-authored with Edward Luttwak, examines innovation in military organizations.
5 Above all, Israel succeeded in surprising Iran. Through coordinated operations, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in concert with the United States, delivered powerful and precise blows to critical Iranianmilitary infrastructure, particularly its deeply fortified nuclear facilities. This was a campaign meticulously designed to achieve strategic objectives while avoiding a prolonged regional war. In doing so, Israel demonstrated clear military superiority, exploited the element of surprise, and concluded the campaign on terms widely viewed as optimal from a strategic standpoint. This volume seeks to provide a panoramic and multidisciplinary view of the war and its broader implications. Authored by leading experts in the fields of strategy, international relations, defense policy, and energy geopolitics, the study presents a layered, while not yet comprehensive, analysis that goes beyond battlefield outcomes. It examines the roles played by key global actors – the United States, China, Russia, India and Pakistan – and addresses crucial strategic domains, including nuclear policy, missile defense, energy markets and multilateral defense frameworks. PART I: ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES VERSUS IRAN IN THE IRAN WAR The first part of the analysis examines the strategic dynamics between Israel and the United States during the Iran War. Ran Segev’s assessment of Israel’s strategic calculus makes clear that the struggle against Iran’s nuclear program has long been at the core of Israeli national security strategy. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu adopted a policy that placed Israel at the forefront of international efforts to counter Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) imposed certain limitations on Iran’s nuclear activities, but from Israel’s perspective, it suffered from significant flaws. By 2024, Iran had achieved the capacity to enrich sufficient fissile material for nine to ten atomic bombs within a matter of weeks, effectively becoming a “threshold state.” From January 2025 onwards, Israeli intelligence assessed with increasing concern that Iran was moving toward nuclear breakout. The subsequent military operation against Iran marked a notable shift in Israel’s strategy. Beyond Iran’snuclear advancements, twoadditional factors reinforced Israel’s determination: the elimination of Iran’s “ring of fire” around Israel during the Iron Swords war, and the strategic alliance with the United States. From Israel’s standpoint, close Photo: Shutterstock coordination with Washington was essential in planning and executing the attack. In Israel’s judgment, in addition to dismantling the Fordow enrichment facility, active American participation would be critical in compelling Iran to concede. Today, Israel can be confident in its strength but must remain vigilant; regarding Iran, Israelis know they can never afford to become complacent. Brigadier-General (ret.) Eran Ortal characterizes Operation Rising Lion as an outstanding military achievement, but stresses that it did not in itself fulfill Israel’s broader strategic objectives. As successful as Rising Lion was, it reaffirmed David Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine: Israel is not a regional hegemon and does not unilaterally shape the regional order. To preserve its regional and global advantages, continue preventing Iranian nuclearization, and support the free world with robust and repeatable military capabilities, Israel must critically assess both the successes and the limitations of the war. Among the clearest lessons is the value of initiative and surprise. Additional takeaways include: the potential to sustain a significant multi-layered qualitative advantage; approaches to aerial warfare that integrate stand-in covert stratagems with other operational components; the inherent vulnerability of centralized forces to decapitation strikes; the strategic effect of eliminating technical expertise by targeting engineers and facilities; recognition that the future of missile defense will rely on enhancing offensive components; and the potential of combining covert operations with exploitation of supply chains to produce kinetic effects. Dr. Uzi Rubin notes that Operation Rising Lion featured the most intensive confrontation to date between Iran’s offensive missile arsenal and Israel’s active and passive defenses. Israel’s defensive concept relied not only on its multilayered missile defense system, developed in cooperation with the United States, but also on preemptive airstrikes against Iranian missile launchers, which had a measurable impact. This focus on suppressing Iran’s launch capability represented a significant innovation in Israeli air doctrine, dubbed “offensive defense”. Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel suffered an estimated failure rate of 88–90 percent, likely due in part to technical malfunctions. Simultaneously, Israel’s airborne defenses decisively defeated Iran’s UAV offensive. Iran’s campaign appeared to have two principal objectives: to inflict maximum damage and casualties in Israel’s major cities and to disrupt its economy. While the first objective met with partial success, the second failed entirely.
6 Prof. Jonathan Rynhold emphasizes that understanding President Donald Trump’s overarching approach to foreign policy is critical for Israeli decision-makers confronting Iran. While Trump’s first term was marked by consistent and unprecedented support for Israel, his second-term record has proved more mixed. He strongly backed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, yet excluded Israel from several significant diplomatic initiatives, including the ceasefire with the Houthis, Turkish involvement in Syria, and hostage negotiations in Gaza. Rynhold interprets these inconsistencies through the lens of Trump’s “belligerent isolationism”, a blend of anti-interventionism and a readiness to use overwhelming force when US lives or territory are directly threatened. Trump’s stance on “zero enrichment” aligns with Israel’s nuclear red lines, but his position on Iran’s conventional missile capabilities remains ambiguous. This raises the risk of a US-Iran agreement that satisfies Israel’s minimal nuclear requirements but neglects its broader security concerns, which would constrain Israel’s freedom of action against the missile threat. CDR. David A. Levy, USN (ret.) argues that Israel’s 2021 reassignment fromUSEuropeanCommand to US Central Command (USCENTCOM) represented a pivotal strategic shift. This realignment reflected evolving geopolitical realities and deepening security cooperation between Israel and moderate Arab states in the wake of the Abraham Accords. It enabled greater military integration, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and coordinated missile defense with regional partners and US forces, substantially enhancing collective security against Iran and its proxies. The value of this integration was demonstrated during the large-scale Iranian missile and drone attacks of 2024, when multinational defense systems operated seamlessly under USCENTCOM’s unified command. Building on this foundation, Operations Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer showcased a sophisticated multi-domain campaign integrating air, naval, cyber, and special operations that inflicted crippling damage on Iran’s fortified nuclear infrastructure. These coordinated strikes not only set back Tehran’s nuclear program but also opened a diplomatic window that Washington and Jerusalem are now leveraging to expand regional normalization and establish a durable multilateral security architecture with Israel as a central pillar of deterrence and stability. Key Takeaways of the Israel-US Approach • Thewar should be understood as part of Israel’s longstanding campaign to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear breakout status. The resort to major military force reflected disturbing Iranian advances in nuclear and missile capabilities, the prior dismantling of Iran’s regional “ring of fire,” and Israel’s deepening strategic partnership with the United States. • Israel-US military operations were a brilliant tactical and operational success, featuring sophisticated multi-domain integration; leadership decapitation; elimination of critical technical expertise; kinetic covert operations; adoption of the “offensive defense” doctrine; and seamless multinational missile defense coordination. • Strategically, the war underscored Israel’s limitations: while highly capable, it cannot unilaterally shape the regional order. American political and military coordination was indispensable in securing favorable terms for the war’s termination. • US conduct reflected Trump’s “belligerent isolationism”: reluctance to engage in open-ended interventions combined with a readiness to apply overwhelming force to protect American lives and territory. While aligned on “zero enrichment”, US-Israeli views may diverge on Iran’s missile threat. • Israel, together with the United States, must continuetoadapt, innovate, andinstitutionalize lessons learned from the campaign’s strengths and limitations to prepare for future regional hostilities and to turn tactical success into a sustainable strategic method. PART II: OTHER PLAYERS’ REACTIONS TO THE WAR Dr. Elai Rettig examines the reaction of the global oil markets, noting their remarkable stability during the 12-day Israel-Iran War despite the strategic importance of the Arab Gulf region to global oil supply and Iran’s repeated threats to block the Strait of Hormuz. This calm reflected three key trends: 1. A structural oversupply of oil driven by increased production from non-OPEC countries and the accelerating shift toward renewable energy technologies, particularly the growing adoption of electric vehicles in East Asia. 2. Theemergenceofalternativeoverlandtransport corridors to bypass maritime chokepoints, such as those envisioned in projects like the IndiaMiddle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
7 3. China’s increasing vulnerability to Middle Eastern geopolitical disruptions, which is likely to prompt Beijing to diversify its energy supply routes, notably by deepening reliance on Russian sources. Prof. Yoram Evron assesses how the war exposed the limits of China’s Middle East strategy and tempered inflated perceptions of Beijing’s regional influence. While China’s economic partnerships in the region remain intact, the conflict revealed a gap between its proclaimed role and its actual capacity for engagement. Initially aligned with Iran’s axis, Beijing adopted a more cautious stance as Israel gained the upper hand. Its reluctance to offer substantial support to Tehran underscored two core weaknesses: repeated strategic miscalculations and limited regional leverage. These developments, Evron argues, require Israel to reassess its relationship with China. This should entail pragmatically reducing strategic dependencies, closely monitoring Chinese regional behavior, and ensuring that Beijing remains responsive to Israel’s vital interests. Prof. Alexander Shpunt and Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin analyze Russia’s ambivalent stance toward Operation Rising Lion – particularly in its final phase, when the United States joined Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. President Trump’s post-war plan proposes an international nuclear consortium to mitigate proliferation risks while allowing Iran to pursue civilian nuclear power. Russia could theoretically join such a consortium, which would potentially constitute a major diplomatic and strategic prize for Moscow and for Vladimir Putin personally. However, even if the deal is formalized, it remains uncertain whether Russia will ultimately benefit from this arrangement. Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos highlights how the regional escalation of 2025 unfolded along two key fronts: India-Pakistan and Israel-Iran. In April 2025, a deadly terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, prompted a direct Indian military response against Pakistan. Two months later, Israel launched its strike on Iran. These parallel developments revealed intricate interconnections among India, Pakistan, Iran and Israel, aswell asshiftinggeopolitical linkagesbetween South and West Asia. India’s policy, for instance, reflects a delicate balancing act between strategic partnership with Israel, energy and geopolitical considerations regarding Iran, and the dynamics of mutual nuclear deterrence with Pakistan. PART III: THE REGIONAL ‘DAY AFTER’ Looking ahead, Col. (Res.) Shay Shabtai likens the aftermath of the Iran War to the transformative moment following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The lesson from 1967, he argues, is that strategic shifts in the regional balance often accelerate radicalization, particularly in terms of public opinion, more than they produce pragmatic compromise. The challenge for policymakers is to turn the post-Iran War moment into a “Sadat-Begin” opportunity rather than a “Khomeini-bin Laden-Hamas” outcome. In such a catalytic environment, traditional paradigms like peace accords, the two-state solution, and democratization frameworks must be either updated or set aside. Shabtai proposes several preliminary concepts for shaping a new regional geo-strategy, such as: • security partnerships rather than formal coal itions • a regional network of shared infrastructure projects • hybrid state sovereignty models • semi-self governance (SSG) arrangements for conflict-prone areas. In this emerging context, Israel will require more nuanced security policies and smarter partnership strategies to safeguard its interests and shape regional developments. CONCLUSION The fundamental drivers behind Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability and regional power projection remain intact, making further confrontations likely. A comprehensive understanding of the June 2025 war is therefore essential for policymakers, military professionals, and scholars. This panoramic, multidimensional examination spanning operational performance, strategic calculations, and regional and global responses offers critical insights for both decisionmakers and the general public into a conflict that will influence the Middle East’s trajectory for years to come. Photo: Shutterstock
8 PART I ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES VERSUS IRAN IN THE IRAN WAR Photo: Avi Ohayon
9 Israel’s Strategic Calculus Ever since 2003, when the nature of Iran’s nuclear program was exposed to the world as military, the struggle against that program has been at the center of Israeli National Security Strategy. The policy of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was based on the premise that Israel should not be at the forefront of the struggle, but should instead let the US and other Western countries lead the campaign against Iran’s nuclear program. Arguing that Israel’s leading of the campaign would absolve other countries from taking full responsibility for frustrating Iran’s intentions, Sharon ordered the Mossad to commit itself to a clandestine campaign to delay and deny Iran’s developing progress in pursuit of nuclear military capability as much as possible. Prime Minister Olmert continued this approach. When Benjamin Netanyahu returned to the premier’s office in 2009, he adopted a different approach, placing Israel at the forefront of the effort against Iran’s nuclear program. He exposed the lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA inspection regime, which was confined only to “legitimate” enrichment activity. He argued that Iran had invested a great deal in the military layers of the program, including conducting research on weaponization, building a secret enrichment site at Fordow (the existence of which Iran only admitted after it had been exposed by intelligence means), and attempting to enrich uranium to a military grade of over 90 percent. The full magnitude of Iran’s duplicity toward the IAEA was exposed by Israel after the Mossad managed to take hold of Iran’s nuclear archive and bring it to Israel in 2018. In the years 2011-2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak put the issue of a military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities at the top of Israel’s security agenda. The matter was hotly debated by a select group of ministers, sometimes referred to as the “group of seven/eight”, together with the top leaders of Israel’s military and intelligence organizations. It was understood that Tehran’s reaction to an attack would lead to war with Iran, and probably with Hezbollah as well. At the same time, the supreme command of the IDF and the head of the Mossad argued that Israel’s ability to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities by military means was quite limited. At most, Israel could cause substantial damage to Natanz, but in the final analysis, doing so would only delay Iran’s march towards a nuclear bomb for a limited period. When Benjamin Netanyahu returned to the premier’s office in 2009, he adopted a different approach, placing Israel at the forefront of the effort against Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, theyarguedthatwhilean Israeli attack would likely incur war with Iran or Hezbollah, it was doubtful whether the US under Barack Obama would be ready to back Israel in its defense against Iran. It was even more doubtful that it would assist Israel in direct military action in Iran. After a few months of debate and contemplation, the military and intelligence community prevailed, and Prime Minister Netanyahu decided not to place the issue on the table for a government decision. Israel continued to conduct awidespreaddiplomatic campaign to keep Iran’s intention to obtain a military nuclear capability on the agenda of the international community. PrimeMinisterNetanyahu repeatedly dedicated most of his time during public Mr. Ran Segev Senior Research Fellow at the BESA Center. He served for 31 years in senior positions within the Israeli security establishment, primarily in the fields of intelligence and national security.
10 appearances in the US, at the UN General Assembly, and at other international forums to emphasize the need to stop Iran’s progress towards a bomb ahead of time. Israel tried to convince the international community – mainly the major players in the US and the EU – to employ “Coercive Diplomacy” vis-à-vis Iran by threatening to impose crippling economic sanctions upon it if it continued to pursue its nuclear program. It was hoped in Israel that economic pressure would facilitate the attainment of a negotiated arrangement that would restrict Iran’s nuclear activity to fields that are devoid of any military implications. In reality, Iran became what is termed a “threshold state” – that is, a state that has both the technology and the material it needs to transform very quickly into a state with an atomic military capability. In 2015, under US leadership, negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program resulted in an agreed framework. The JCPOA Agreement, sanctioned by a Security Council resolution, imposed certain limitations on Iran, especially regarding its enrichment of uranium. However, from the Israeli perspective, the agreement had many flaws. It allowed Iran to continue researching and developing more modern and efficient centrifuges. Furthermore, it did not put any limits on Iran’s production capabilities in this field and allowed Iran to keep its two main enrichment facilities, Natanz and Fordow, intact. It also gave Iran the opportunity to enrich uranium in well-protected sites. It should be remembered that Fordow was originally built as a secret, impenetrable facility expressly intended for the purpose of enriching uranium to military level. While Israel was frustrated with the results of its diplomatic effort, it continued to employ clandestine and covert operations in Iran in order to sabotage and slow down its progress in stockpiling enriched uranium and developing other capabilities that could serve in the nuclear military program. This activity included sophisticated cyber operations against the centrifuges in Natanz. According to reports published in international media, Israel also managed to sabotage enrichment in Natanz by detonating explosives at the site that caused the destruction of thousands of centrifuges. But while Israel’s clandestine activity managed to slow down Iran’s progress, it remained a form of limited warfare that would delay, but not stop, the Iranian march towards the bomb. From 2018 onwards, after the US declared that it no longer adhered to the 2015 agreement and offered to negotiate a new one, Iran embarked on a new phase in its development of military-related capabilities. It started to enrich uranium to the level of 60 percent, which is very close to the level of fissile material (i.e., 90 percent). Uranium enriched to 60 percent can be easily and swiftly enriched to military grade. Iran also increased its volume of enriched uranium. By 2024 it was in possession of 400 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium. According to the experts who wrote the IAEA reports, from the moment of decision, Iran could enrich enough fissile material for nine to ten atomic bombs within a few weeks. In reality, Iran became what is termed a “threshold state” – that is, a state that has both the technology and the material it needs to transform very quickly into a state with an atomic military capability. THE DECISION TO LAUNCH A FULL-SCALE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST IRAN The military operation against Iran that began on June 13 signified a complete change in Israel’s strategy towards Iran’s nuclear program. It marked a departure from the limited, mainly clandestine operations that had been carried out in Iran for nearly 20 years to open military confrontation. This was an act of war, with all its implications, and Iran was expected to respond with all the military measures at its disposal. What was the main reason for Israel’s decision to deviate from its previous cautious strategy and risk war with a powerful state like Iran, whosemilitary is more powerful than those of Hamas or Hezbollah? By 2024, Iran was considered and, indeed, behaved like a threshold state based on the leap forward in enrichment, in terms of both percentage (60 percent, one step short of military grade) and quantity (a swift increase from 100 kilograms to 400 kilograms). Regime spokesmen openly boasted that Iran had the capability to produce an atomic bomb but had decided not to. Israel, which maintains close intelligence surveillance of Iran’s Photo: Shutterstock
11 nuclear activity, found indications in late 2024 and especially from January 2025 onwards that Iran was moving from threshold status towards nuclear breakout, with the aimof obtaining a nuclear device that could be exploded and tested as a bomb within a few months. In January 2025, Israelimilitary intelligence reported that Iran’s “weapon group”, which included highly skilled scientists, had been reassembled and was working earnestly under tight secretive cover to master the technology needed to initiate the “chain reaction” – i.e., the explosion process of an atomic bomb. The weapon group’s work made substantial advancements and improved Iran’s ability to move fast towards the possession of reliable detonation technology. The strategic dilemma facing Israel at that pointwas this. Because the time frame from Iran’s movement from threshold to capacity had been shortened, the threat of nuclear breakout had become more imminent. It was incumbent on Israel to preempt that threat by direct military means before the Iranians attained the bomb. As the threat continued to loom, the decision was taken in late 2024 to attack Iran as soon as the strategic situation was ripe, but no later than the first half of 2025. The first plans to launch a widespread air campaign against Iranwerefinalizedby the IDF in January2025. The earliest date for attack was to be in April 2025. Political considerations, mainly regarding Israel’s strategic cooperation with the US, determined the date to be June 13, one day after the expiration of the 60-day period President Trump had presented to Iran as the deadline for a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program. By June, the Israeli Air Force was ready, and the order was given after it was approved by the Israeli cabinet. The question of the role of the US in the military campaign against Iran loomed large in the discussions and preparations ahead of the war. Donald Trump had been reelected to the US presidency in November 2024. It was clear in Israel that from a political, strategic and military standpoint, American support was a vital factor in Israeli consideration of a war with Iran. The Israeli decision to wage war on Iran was presented to President Trump by Prime Minister Netanyahu in February 2025 at their first meeting of Trump’s second term. From that meeting onwards, there was close and continuous coordination between Israel and the US From the Israeli point of view, active US participation would make an enormous contribution towards minimizing the cost of the war. The military operation against Iran that began on June 13 signified a complete change in Israel’s strategy towards Iran’s nuclear program The operational capabilities of the US as a military superpower far surpassed those of Israel, especially with regard to the challenge of dismantling Fordow. But in Israeli eyes, the strategic continuation of US involvement in the war was no less important. Israel planned a short war, to last between 7 and 13 days, and hoped it would be able to conclude a ceasefire with Iran after the operational goals of the air campaign had been achieved. It was estimated in Israel that active American participation would be instrumental in forcing Iran to concede that it was too risky to continue the war and to accept the offer of a ceasefire.
12 The decision-making process in Israel was marked by close and harmonious cooperation between the military and intelligence community and the political level. It was clearly understood that maintaining secrecy was the key to the success of the whole enterprise. Indeed, there were no leaks, and all the key participants in the decision rose to the challenge. CONCLUSION When the Israeli decision was taken to launch a full-scale military operation against Iran, it was estimated that the price in terms of Israeli casualties, both military and civilian, might be substantial. But taking into account the severity of the threat; i.e., that Iran might complete the production of a nuclear bomb, it was clear that the price of inaction could potentially be much higher: it could result in a threat to Israel’s very existence. The decision to act was not taken lightly. However, two factors strengthened Israeli resolve to launch the operation: the elimination of Iran’s “ring of fire” around Israel, which included Hamas and Hezbollah; and the removal of any aerial threat to the Israeli air force over Syria due to the collapse of the Assad regime. Because the time frame from Iran’smovement fromthreshold to capacity had been shortened, the threat of nuclear breakout had become more imminent. The other major factor in Israel’s calculationwas the strategic alliance with the US. Since February 2025, following the meeting in the White House, it was clear that President Trump was absolutely sincere in declaring that Iran should not have nuclear weapons. About five months later, when Israel sent its air force into Iranian airspace, there was deep and elaborate cooperation between Israel and the US, including an understanding that direct US involvement would likely be the key to forcing Iran to accept a ceasefire offer to end the war. The military campaigns of the two states severely crippled Iran’s nuclear program. The enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow were put out of operation and the conversion facility in Isfahan was destroyed. Around 20 key scientists in the weapons group were also killed. And yet, Iran’s intentions in the nuclear field are still an open question. Will Tehran resume its efforts to have a bomb? Iran’s enrichment capacity was severely damaged due to the destruction inflicted on Natanz and Fordow, but the country still has 400 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium that can be upgraded to military level (90 percent) in a very short time. Furthermore, Iran has stockpiled at least 200 kilograms of enriched uranium to the level of 20 percent and has dispersed the production and storage of centrifuges to various locations. It is conceivable that, should the regime wish to resume its enrichment activity, it will be able to do so, if on a much smaller scale. The “weapon group” was severely weakened due to the elimination of Iran’s hard core of scientists. But it should be noted that since the war, Iran has ceased all forms of cooperationwith the I.A.E.A. This means that for the first time since it signed the NPT accord, Iran is now free of any foreign supervision. As for Iranian intentions, they remain unknown. Iran invested huge sums in its nuclear program, and most of its investment was obliterated in 12 days. Iran is vengeful and humiliated, but it is also resilient. It is too early to predict what it will do, and it should be closely monitored by Israel and the US. There should be no complacency that the Iranian nuclear threat has been removed for good. Israel and the US achieved a great deal in the war with Iran, but the threat remains that Iran may become a nuclear state. The war did demonstrate, however, that highly trained and efficient air power, combined with the right kind of intelligence, can deal with emerging threats with speed and ferocity, should they be called for. Today, Israel is now perceived in the region and the international arena as the strongest military force in the Levant. Among Arab-majority nations, Israel is feared and loathed by many, and many pin their hopes for Israel’s destruction on Iran. In Biblical times, the prophet Amos warned against complacency: “Woe to you who are at ease in Zion and confident on the hills of Samaria” (Amos, chapter 6:1). Today, Israel should be confident in its strength but always remain vigilant. With regard to Iran, we can never be at ease in Zion.
13 Photo: Shutterstock Photo: Shutterstock
14 Operation Rising Lion: A Military Perspective Over the course of 12 days in June 2025, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) paralyzed and destroyed Iran’s air defense capabilities to establish air superiority, then struck the Iranian nuclear sites known to Israel and the West (with the exception of the Fordow installation), most of Iran’s known missile production infrastructure, and a large part of Iran’s missile launching capabilities. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) achieved all that while also targeting and killing high-ranking commanders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and key members of the Iranian nuclear capability’s development team. The strategic results of the operation will be determined over the course of the coming months and years. Tactical success is a must, but it is not sufficient. On the operational level, Rising Lion was probably the most successful display of military performance of the 21st century to date. It was an impressive manifestation of intelligence, precision strikes, air superiority, cyber operations, special and covert operations, air defense, civil defense, and above all: a highly skilled and original integration of these components. The offensive also set some important precedents: acquisition of air superiority within an operating range of about 2,000 km against dense and advanced air defense systems and for a significant period of time; integration of covert ops within enemy territory with an overt military attack; a successful combination of cyber operations as a component of a kinetic operation; and more. The operation is also of global importance from a Great Power Competition (GPC) perspective. It demonstrated that the typical military challenge facing the Western world is not insurmountable. The IDF, with limited US operational assistance, has defeated, at least for the time being, a radical adversary that relies on ballistic missiles for deterrence on the one hand and surface-to-air missiles for defense on the other. This is also the basic configuration of the Russian and Chinese military challenge. Operation Rising Lion contradicted the attrition premise by clearly defeating quantity with quality Both failures and successes, particularly on this scale, provide fundamental lessons that must be heeded. Learning from this war is essential in the concrete context of Israeli strategy and the future of the Iranian-Israeli conflict, but also on the more fundamental military level. The clearest and most banal lesson is the advantage of initiative and surprise. The gap between the failure of October 7 and the success of Rising Lion speaks for itself. But strategic conditions do not always allow for initiative and preventive wars, and in any case, initiative alone is not a sufficient condition for success. With that in mind, a few initial observations and points can be laid out: 1. There is a question mark over Israel’s “regional power” status. The success in Iran has returned phrases like “regional power” and “a new Middle East” to Israeli discourse. In fact, the depth of Israel’s operational success in Iran only highlights the gap between military excellence and strategic success. It is already clear that even though the IDF destroyed most of the targets that were originally Brigadier-General (ret.) Eran Ortal Former Commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD, 2022, Hebrew) explores the IDF’s need to adapt, innovate, and renew a decisive war approach.
15 therefore unable to defend itself by itself, an old Israeli defense principle. The strategic implications of this dependence are already being reflected in Israel’s shift toward the American position on the issue of a ceasefire in Gaza. 2. Rising Lion was made possible by a long war that created the essential conditions. First, the war on Israel initiated by Hamas on Oct 7, 2023, led to the removal of the Iranian outposts that had deterred Israel from going after the Iranian nuclear program in the past: Hamas in Gaza, and then Hezbollah in Lebanon in the fall of 2024. Second, the two rounds of blows between Israel and Iran, in April and October 2024, enabled Israel to destroy key components of Iran’s air defense systems and missile factories. Thus, a window of opportunity was created for a larger operation later on. Third, mapped and more, there is still a real possibility that the Iranians will accelerate their nuclearization and missile program. This fact illustrates the validity of the fundamental premise of David Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine: Israel is not a regional power. It does not shape the region to its will and cannot change its basic hostility towards the Jewish State. All Israel can do is build a highly capable military force and take military initiative from time to time in order to remove extreme and immediate threats, and in so doing, achieve temporary and relative security. The offensive in Iran highlights this diagnosis. As successful as Rising Lion was, it also made clear the unprecedented dependency of Israel on American direct military participation. Israel had to wait for the American strike on the Fordow facility and heavily rely on US and foreign assistance for its missile and air defense. It was Photo: Shutterstock
16 less directly tied to the war but also not completely detached from it were the strategic conditions created when the Trump administration entered into negotiations with Iran and bound it within a 60-day timeframe. This greatly improved the chances that the United States would join an Israeli campaign against the Iranian nuclear programwith the failure of the talks and the possible success of an Israeli military initiative. Without this possibility, the Israeli offensive had a low chance of achieving its goal. That refers not only to the destruction of the Fordow site, but more importantly to the reliable threat of repeated future American strikes if needed. In view of the essential nature of the preliminary conditions, the challenge now facing the IDF is to build an ability to repeat a successful operation in Iran when at least some those conditions are not met. Scenarios could include a rapid restoration of Iran’s air defense capabilities or a moving of the Iranian center of gravity to the east of the country, an additional 500-1,000 km away from the area where Israel operated during Rising Lion. 3.Westvs. Eastandqualityvs. quantity. Somemilitary researchers, particularly those focused on the war in Ukraine, emphasized the advantages of the Eastern approach to war over theWestern. In short, members of this school saw the Western tendency toward expensive equipment, modern platforms and precision munitions as a kind of addiction. They maintained that quantity defeats quality, and Western armies will not be able to withstand the strength of the industrial war approach. Operation Rising Lion contradicted that premise by clearly defeating quantity (missiles, simple kamikaze UAVs and bunkers in this case) with quality (advanced fighter jets, special munitions and advanced intercepting capabilities). Iran did manage to hit several strategic sites but failed to cause critical functional damage. Thewar illustrated the potential inherent in a significant qualitative advantage based on many layers (intelligence, special forces, technology, platforms, and people) over the Iranian approach, which assumed quantities would triumph. But this observation must be followed by a warning. If a qualitative advantage is not sufficiently established, or if the war in question drags on into a prolonged attrition, the Eastern industrial approach might have the upper hand. 4. Approaches to aerial operations. The IAF was successful, as it operated in Iranian airspace, at implementing its distinctive approach to war. This approach, which was developed in the decades following the 1973 War, has several principles. The first is ensuring air superiority through the suppression and destruction of air defense systems as a prerequisite for future missions. The second is the hunting of stealth surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile launchers through the permanent presence of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. These two principles enable the third: a massive and flexible capacity to deliver a variety of short-range, more affordable munitions to their targets by repeated fighter-jet sorties. This approach, which was previously used in the skies of Syria and Lebanon, was adapted to the very different challenge of Iran by integrating stand-in covert stratagems and other components. This uniquely Israeli mode of operation is distinctly different from that of the Americans and could serve as a doctrinal learning platform. The American barrier of fear, driven by two decades of failed interventions in the region, was broken. The war demonstrated that amilitary operation of defined limited goals can enhance, rather than drain, national power 5. Decapitation. The operation illustrated how highly centralized military organizations, including well-trained state armies like the Iranian IRGC, are vulnerable in terms of command and control and chain of command. This is not a trivial or selfevident observation. An orderly state military force is expected to have a redundant command and control system and layers of backups regarding the chain of command. In reality, the IRGC and the Iranian military failed to recover for the duration of the entire offensive. This provided Israel with concrete benefits, as it faced smaller salvos of missiles than expected and a malfunctioning Iranian air defense system. The lesson might be that centralized forces, particularly those that stress loyalty to the regime and thus have the same people serving in key positions for very long periods, are more sensitive to decapitation than previously assessed. 6. Elimination of know-how. Another original element of Israel’s approach to war was the effort to eliminate Iranian know-how in the nuclear, missiles and weapons fields. Israel continued its
17 Photo: Shutterstock
18 to eliminate Iranian know-how in the nuclear, missiles and weapons fields. Israel continued its covert approach of recent decades against the nuclear project and “stretched” it to a war-time scale, striking dozens of specific military-dedicated Iranian engineers. Will the elimination of a key group of engineers, as well as the destruction of Iran’s archive site and labs, have a significant role to play in disrupting the regime’s future projects? Can a military offensive have a substantial negative effect on an opponent’s know-how? These are intriguing questions. 7. Counter-missile warfare. Israel’s air defense system is probably the world’s most dense, multilayered and sophisticated. Although inventory has been eroded during the war since October 2023, Israel became highly experienced at responding to attacks, including two large missile attacks from Iran in 2024. It prepared for this moment by adding layers of technology, redeploying, and accelerating production over many months. The Israeli array was also reinforced by US military ground and sea air defense (THAAD batteries and Aegis ships) and additional aerial warning and interception capabilities. Despite all that, some highly sensitive targets in Israel were hit, luckily without incurring functional damage. Thirty Israeli civilians were killed, thousands were hurt, and thousands of homes were damaged. The relative reduction of damage to Israel was also due in part to Israel’s success at disrupting Iran’s ability to coordinate large salvos, as well as the significant damage inflicted on Iran’s launchers and launching facilities. The future of missile warfare, it seems, lies in the increased effectiveness of the offensive component at overcoming the inherent difficulty of this mission. 8. Special vs. repetitive capabilities. Two original and daring operations that included similar elements – Ukraine’s Spider Web operation in Russia and Israel’s Operation Rising Lion – combined special intelligence operations and the intrusion and operation of covert attack capabilities within enemy territory. The September 2024 pagers operation against Lebanese Hezbollah should also be recalled. Three major events of this nature cannot be taken as a coincidence. The potential of combining covert operations and exploiting supply chains for kinetic operationswithin the frameworkofmilitary systems has been systematically demonstrated. In the Israeli case, both operations were characterized by close coordination of the covert and military dimensions. Alongside the successes, the question must be asked: Is this combination of covert and overt really a “new military grammar”, as formulated by John Spencer in his article “Redefining shock and awe”, or is it conduct that will be very difficult to repeat? Are we witnessing a new doctrinal trend or a security breach that will be addressed? More positively, how can we make a systemic method out of a one-time surprise element? The 12-Day War, as successful as it was on the operational level, did not mark the end of the Photo: IDF Spokesman
19 Iranian-Israeli war. In a less optimistic scenario, one possible outcome could be an Iranian breakout to nuclear weapons because of the collapse of its proxy strategy and missile deterrence. This does not mean the war was unnecessary or unsuccessful. The war achieved everything an Israeli military operation could aspire to: destroying critical sites and capabilities and prompting a reassessment of the strategic situation on the other side. It is for precisely this reason that the critical strategic achievement of the war, even beyond the direct damage caused to Iran, was the breaking of the last barrier of fear. It would be appropriate to study the successes and limitations of Operation Rising Lion. Doing so would allow the free world to establish the kind of robust and repetitive military capability that would turn a successful case into a systemic method That barrier was initially broken on October 7, 2023, when Hamas, followed by Hezbollah, dragged Israel into the longest war in its history. Rising Lion’s success in Iranian skies broke the final barrier of fear: a direct confrontation with Iran. This is a mammoth strategic change that will allow Israel to consider additional attacks in the future, a fact that will undoubtedly carry weight in Iranian regime considerations. Even more importantly, the American barrier of fear, driven by two decades of failed interventions in the region, was broken. The war demonstrated that a military operation of defined limited goals can enhance, rather than drain, national power. The worst-case scenario of another prolonged regimechange war was avoided and Iran’s allies, China and Russia, probably took notes. America’s support for Israel and the followup American airstrikes on Fordow and Natanz made clear, in the region and elsewhere, that US leadership is irreplaceable for anyone who hopes to stand up to revisionist aggressive regional actors. To preserve these achievements, as well as continue to prevent the nuclearization of the Middle East, it would be appropriate to study the successes and limitations of Operation Rising Lion. Doing sowould allow the free world to establish the kind of robust and repetitive military capability that would turn a successful case into a systemic method.
20 The Air and Missile Defense of Israel During Operation Rising Lion Operation Rising Lion saw the most intensive battle to date between Iran’s offensive missile array and Israel’s active and passive defense. While Iran’s missile offensive was patterned according to the long-declared strategy of retaliation by massive salvos of ballisticmissiles andUAVs, Israel’s defensive strategy relied not only on its multi-layer missile defense shield but also on a preemptive air offensive against Iran’s missile launchers, which measurably curtailed Iran’s missile firepower. At the same time, Israel’s airborne defense – perhaps aided by friendly air forces – succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat on the Iranian UAV offensive. Operation Rising Lion saw the most intensive battle to date between Iran’s offensive missile array and Israel’s active and passive defense Israel’s Operation Rising Lion started with an airborne surprise attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including Iran’s nuclear experts, in the early morning hours of June 13, 2025. The attack was carried out by several hundred crewed and uncrewed aircraft of Israeli Air Force. While there are unconfirmed reports of non-Israeli air bases having been used to launch the strike, it seems more reasonable to assume that close to the entire June 13 attack, as well as subsequent Israeli air operation throughout the 12-day campaign, originated from Israeli territory. The June 13 opening strike targeted not only nuclear assets but also air defense and ballistic missile bases. While an effort at suppressing air defenses is part and parcel of any air force doctrine, the apparently considerable resources dedicated by Israel to the suppression of Iran’s ballistic missile launching capability was a new feature in Israel’s air doctrine. The Iranian threat to retaliate “swiftly, within minutes, and devastatingly” by huge salvos of ballistic missiles was apparently taken by Israel at face value. Hence the extraordinary effort, even during the opening strike, to erode the anticipated Iranian retaliatory missile strikes. Despite Iran’s threat of “swift retaliation within minutes”, it took them about 20 hours to respond. The first Iranian ballistic missile hit Tel Aviv at 21:11 on the night of June 13. This heralded Iran’s Revolutionary Guard operation “True Promise III”, described by them as a “crushing precise response” to Israel’s air offensive. The operation continued throughout the 12 days of war. During its course, Iran launched 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 UAVs against Israeli targets. Anywhere from 59 to 64 ballistic missile impacts were registered within Israel, 33 in major cities and smaller population centers. They caused 30 deaths, wounded about 2,000 people, and damaged thousands of structures. The Iranian UAVs achieved only two minor impacts, one in a small town in northern Israel and the other at an undisclosed location, with no casualties reported. As hinted by its name, operation True Promise III was the third round of Iranian missile attacks on Israel. Its predecessors, True Promise I and II, were short retaliation strikes targeting military installations but causing close to no casualties, civilian or military. In contrast, True Promise III was a protracted missile assault on Israeli population centers, national infrastructure, and military assets. It seems to have had two objectives: first, to maximize damage and casualties in Israel’s major cities; and second, to disrupt Israel’s economy. It partially succeeded in its first objective and failed Dr. Uzi Rubin Senior Researcher at the BESA Center, founder and first director of the Arrow missile defense program in Israel’s Ministry of Defense, and a leading expert on missile defense systems.
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