There is no single structure uniting all Buddhist communities in Russia. Each of the three autonomous republics whose indigenous populations are traditionally Buddhist - Kalmykia, Tuva and Buryatia - has its own structure of Buddhist clergy.
PSCRP
In 2022-2023, the current and future status of those residents of Latvia who hold Russian citizenship was hotly debated. Many residence permits were revoked, and some people who have not declared their intention to obtain a permanent residence permit or who have not passed the Latvian language exam are even getting ready to be forcefully removed from the territory of Latvia. These legislative measures have drawn further attention not only to the Russian citizens living in Latvia, but also to the ethnic Russians (or Russophones) who have Latvian citizenship and can participate directly in the Latvian political process. How has their electoral behaviour changed after February 2022 and which political forces can now claim to represent their interests?
In December 2023, the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program published papers on separatist threats and Church-related antisemitism in Russia, French participation in post-Soviet geopolitical dynamics, the perception of Israel’s war against Hamas in Russia and Ukraine, and the geopolitical (re)orientation of Armenia.
The Eurasian Economic Union declared 2024 the year of IT technologies. This sector has long been well-developed in Armenia, with Armenian IT companies maintaining a close cooperation with Silicon Valley. Thus, Iran will have a unique opportunity to develop its IT technologies, which seemed quite impossible not so long ago.
Located in the very southeast of Europe, Kalmykia, a subject of the Russian Federation in the lower Volga region, has almost never been in the spotlight of the global community.
As the fighting in Gaza develops, Russia's position is becoming increasingly clear: Moscow almost openly supports Hamas as a satellite of Iran, Russia's closest partner in the Middle East. This significantly sets the current situation apart from the relatively balanced approach demonstrated by Moscow during, for instance, the IDF's Operation Protective Edge in 2014, and Russia’s subsequent policy of presenting itself as an “impartial mediator” between all participants in the Middle East conflict.
Currently, Russia is in the process of forming a new state ideology, one that holds conservative values. The Russian Orthodox Church plays a significant role within this ideology. Consequently, the political significance of conservative circles within the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the Jewish question is becoming pronounced.
After the Second Karabakh War (2020) and especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2022), France saw a number of new diplomatic opportunities opening up for it in the southern post-Soviet space as Russia's traditional influence waned.
It is no secret that the Russian authorities mobilized mostly people from the provinces for the war in Ukraine in an effort to avoid growing discontent in the capital cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. But a number of other population groups experience the feeling of disproportionate use of their human resources for military purposes.
BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 1 (September-October 2023)