In September 2025, the analytical papers produced by the PSCRP covered such subregions as Central Asia, South Caucasus, and the Western part of the post-Soviet space.
PSCRP
The core element in the foreign policy of post-Soviet countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is so-called multivectoralism: maintaining relations with multiple global actors without binding themselves exclusively to any single one. These states seek to balance ties with the China–Russia axis and the collective West (including the USA and the EU—although it should be noted that the internal fragility of this grouping has never been as evident as it is now).
At the United Nations General Assembly this year, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov did not disguise where Bishkek’s loyalties lie. In his speech, he castigated Western sanctions on Kyrgyz banks and reaffirmed that his country would not sever ties with Russia. That intervention was not just diplomatic theater. It was a blunt reminder that Kyrgyzstan’s leadership views Moscow not as an optional partner but as the central axis of its political and economic survival.
On September 1, the EU’s ultimatum to Georgia expired, threatening the suspension of visa-free travel unless controversial laws targeting NGOs and LGBT rights were repealed and repression against protesters ceased. The Georgian leadership not only ignored these demands but doubled down, while simultaneously seeking to restore ties with the U.S. and continuing to serve as a key hub for Russian sanctions evasion. The unfolding situation raises questions about Europe’s leverage, Washington’s stance, and the risks of Georgia drifting further into Moscow’s orbit.
In recent years, questions of national identity have become central to understanding political and social developments across the post-Soviet space. This report compares the Ukrainian and Belarusian experiences, showing how divergent perceptions of identity can lead to violent conflict, while also explaining why Belarus has thus far avoided such outcomes.
Since the initialing of the peace treaty text between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as the signing of the joint declaration by the two countries’ leaders in Washington on August 8, 2025, Russia has been escalating its information warfare in the South Caucasus. Using a “carrot and stick” approach, Moscow seeks to portray itself as a wronged party supposedly striving to improve relations, while simultaneously fueling escalation and preparing its own population for the possibility of conflict in the south.
This month’s monitoring highlights a diverse range of studies , from RAND Europe’s analysis of Russian strategic culture and nuclear doctrine to the Global Initiative’s mapping of organized crime in the South Caucasus, the reports reviewed here underscore the complex interplay of political, criminal, and societal forces. Alongside these, Minna-Kerttu M. Kekki’s work on collective memory, ICNL’s guidance on NGO self-regulation, and sociological insights into health perceptions from Georgia illustrate how narratives, ethics, and public attitudes shape contemporary challenges.
The diplomatic blitz undertaken in August 2025 by the U.S. president, during which Donald Trump and members of his administration sought to persuade the leaders of Russia and Ukraine to make mutual concessions in order to end the active phase of the war that has been ongoing between these countries for three and a half years, had, as of this writing, produced no clear results that were even roughly acceptable to all sides. According to the media, President Trump still assures his allies that the talks are proceeding according to plan, in practice these negotiations are moving slowly.
In August 2025, policy papers by the PSCR program at the BESA Center focused on the conflict developments in the South Caucasus and the European part of the post-Soviet sphere.
On August 8, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump welcomed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to the White House, where the two leaders signed a joint declaration on peace, ending nearly four decades of bitter conflict between the two post-Soviet states in the South Caucasus.